Abstract
The principal/agent paradigm provides a useful vehicle for examining a wide range of contractual relationships. Recent theoretical advances in the modeling of this relationship have enriched our understanding of the interplay between risk sharing and incentives in the design of optimal contracts.
This paper represents part of a research project, sponsored by the Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education, that John Butterworth was working on before his death. I feel very privileged to have worked with John on this project. John’s gifted scholarship and gracious personality made it an enriching academic and human experience.
Ruth Freedman supplied diligent research assistance for an earlier version. Financial support for the current revision from the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada is also acknowledged. Khoa Tran’s assistance with computer programming for this latest version is appreciated. Jerry Feltham provided extensive and helpful comments on an earlier draft. George Blazenko and Melissa Van Kessel provided helpful assistance.
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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston
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Boyle, P.P., Butterworth, J.E. (1988). The Principal/Agent Problem—Numerical Solutions. In: Feltham, G.A., Amershi, A.H., Ziemba, W.T. (eds) Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2667-7_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2667-7_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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