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Value of Information in Bimatrix Games

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Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts

Abstract

Economic analysis of accounting debates focuses on the information provided by the accounting system. “Value of information” is a central theme in this approach. In a decision making context, this is illustrated by the aggregation analyses of Butterworth [1972] and Feltham [1977]. In an implementation or control context, it is illustrated by Baiman-Demski’s [1980] analysis of variance investigation strategies and responsibility accounting.

Amin Amershi, Rick Antle, Stan Baiman, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry Feltham, and Mark Wolfson provided helpful comments. Financial support from the National Science Foundation grant IST84–10907 is gratefully acknowledged.

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Authors
  1. Joel S. Demski
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of British Columbia, Canada

    Gerald A. Feltham  & William T. Ziemba  & 

  2. University of Minnesota, USA

    Amin H. Amershi

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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston

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Demski, J.S. (1988). Value of Information in Bimatrix Games. In: Feltham, G.A., Amershi, A.H., Ziemba, W.T. (eds) Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2667-7_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2667-7_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7702-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2667-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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