Abstract
Cognitive science contains two sharply different lines of thought about thought. We might call them ‘the Folk Line’ and ‘the Revisionist Line’.
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Devitt, M. (1989). A Narrow Representational Theory of the Mind. In: Silvers, S. (eds) Rerepresentation. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 40. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2649-3_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2649-3_18
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