Abstract
It has often been claimed that the by now familiar possible-two rids analysis of propositional attitudes like knowledge and belief which I have advocated since 1962 is unrealistic,1 if not downright mistaken, because it apparently commits us to the assumption of logical omniscience, that is, to the assumption that everyone knows all the logical consequences of what he knows, and analogously for all the other propositional attitudes. Since the assumption of such logical omniscience is obviously mistaken, this commitment seems to constitute a grave objection to the whole possible-worlds treatment of propositional attitudes.
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Notes
For the analysis, see Knowledge and Belief (Cornell U.P., Ithaca, N.Y., 1962); Models for Modalities (D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1969); The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities (D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1975).
Cf. my book, Logic, Language-Games, and Information (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973).
See e.g., ‘Surface Information and Depth Information’, in Jaakko Hintikka and Patrick Suppes (eds.), Information and Inference (D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1970), pp. 263–297; ‘Knowledge, Belief, and Logical Consequence’, Ajatus 32 (1970) 32–47; and Logic, Language-Games, and Information (note 2 above), especially chapters 7–8 and 10).
For instance, M.J. Cresswell works with a modified truth-definition for negation in his papers ‘Classical Intensional Logics’, Theoria 36 (1970) 347–372, and
M.J. Cresswell ‘Intensional Logics and Logical Truth’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (1972) 2–15.
See ‘Surface Semantics: Definition and Its Motivation’, in Hughes Leblanc (ed.), Truth, Syntax, and Modality (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1973), pp. 128–147.
See above pp.455–474.
See especially the last chapter of my book, Logic. Language-Games, and Information (note 2 above). Cf. also ‘Surface Information and Depth Information’ (note 3 above).
See ‘Surface Semantics’ (note 5 above), pp. 134–136.
‘Surface Semantics’ (note 5 above), pp. 135–136.
Ibid., p. 136.
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Hintikka, J., Hintikka, M.B. (1989). Impossible Possible Worlds Vindicated. In: The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic. Synthese Library, vol 200. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2647-9_5
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