Abstract
I once read about a cannibal tribe in which nobody could become a chieftain without disposing of one of the earlier ones and eating him. It seems to me sometimes that philosophers must be descendants of that tribe. When a philosopher develops a new theory, it almost invariably seems more important to him to use it to try to clobber an earlier one rather than to try to see if the two are perhaps complementary — and to see what there is, perhaps, to be learned from the earlier theory.
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Notes
This note was written as a comment on Jon Barwise and John Perry, ‘Situations and Attitudes,’ Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981), 668–91, presented at the APA Symposium on the Logic of Perception and Belief, December 30, 1981.
‘Semantical Games and Temporal Discourse,’ Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (1982), 3–22.
Alice ter Meulen, ‘Partial Models for Speaker Reference’ (forthcoming).
Cf. here Hao Wang, ‘Remarks on Machines, Sets, and the Decision Problem,’ in J. N. Crossley and M. A. E. Dummett (eds.), Formal Systems and Recursive Functions, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1965, pp. 304–20;
Robert Berger, The Undecidability of the Domino Problem (Memoirs of the American Mathematical Society, No. 66), Providence, R.I., 1966.
See their papers (the last two in the volume) in Esa Saarinen (ed.), Game-Theoretical Semantics, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979.
Cf. Saul Kripke, ‘Identity Through Time,’ paper delivered at the Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting of APA, Eastern Division, New York, December 27–30, 1979;
and W. V. Quine, ‘Worlds Away,’ Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), 859–63.
Jaakko Hintikka, ‘On Sense, Reference, and the Objects of Knowledge,’ Epistemologia 3 (1980), 143–64.
See Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability, Cambridge University Press, 1975;
also Ian Hacking, ‘The Leibniz-Carnap Program for Inductive Logic,’ Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), 597–610.
See L. J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, John Wiley, New York, 1954.
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Hintikka, J., Hintikka, M.B. (1989). Situations, Possible Worlds, and Attitudes. In: The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic. Synthese Library, vol 200. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2647-9_13
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