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How can Language be Sexist?

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Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 200))

Abstract

Prima facie, our title question may seem pointless. Barring bigots, virtually everybody will agree that language is frequently used in a sexist way. Why, then, the question?

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Notes

  1. Cf. Alfred Tarski, ‘The concept of truth in formalized languages’, in Alfred Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1956, pp. 152–278.

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  2. Cf. Richmond H. Thomason (ed.), Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague, Yale U.P., New Haven, 1974

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  3. D. R. Dowty, R. E. Wall, and S. Peters, Introduction to Montague Semantics, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981.

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  4. Cf., e.g., Jerry A. Fodor, The Language of Thought, Thomas Y. Crowell, New York, 1975.

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  5. Further observations concerning this distinction are made in Jaakko Hintikka and Merrill B. Hintikka, ‘Towards a general theory of individuation and identification’, partly forthcoming in the proceedings of the Sixth International Wittgenstein Symposium, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna, 1982.

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  6. This point is well argued in the seminal last chapter ‘The word “good”’ of Paul Ziff, Semantic Analysis, Cornell, U.P., Ithaca, N.Y., 1960.

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  7. Cf. here A. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1960.

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  8. P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (The Library of Living Philosophers), Tudor, New York, 1952, pp. 3–39, especially p. 9.

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  9. Yrjö Hirn, ‘Voltaires hjärta’, in Yrjö Hirn, De lagerkrönta skoplaggen, Söderström & Co., Helsinki, 1951.

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  10. For an interesting discussion, see chapter 2 of C. S. Lewis, Studies in Words, second ed., Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 1967.

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  11. Cf. Inge K. Broverman, Donald M. Broverman, et al., ‘Sex-role stereotypes and clinical judgments of mental health’, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 34, No. 1 (1970), 1–7.

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  12. Cf. Adkins, op. cit. (Note 6 above), especially chapter 3.

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  13. See his books Models for Modalities, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1969, and The Intentions ofIntentionality, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1975.

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  15. Cf. Saul Kripke, ‘Identity through time’, paper delivered at the Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting of APA Eastern Division, New York, December 27–30, 1979.

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  16. This point has been implicit in Jaakko Hintikka’s work ever since the last chapter of Knowledge and Belief, Cornell U.P., Ithaca, N.Y., 1962.

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  17. Op. cit. (note 12 above).

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  18. David Lewis, ‘Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic’, Journal of Philosophy 65(1968), 113–126.

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  19. Cf., e.g., J. Kagan, H. A. Moss, and I. E. Sigel, ‘The psychological significance of styles of conceptualization’, in J. C. Wright and J. Kagan (eds.), Basic Cognitive Processes in Children (Society for Research in Child Development Monograph 28, no. 2), 1963.

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  20. Cf. e.g., Eleanor E. Maccoby, ‘Sex differences in intellectual functioning’, in Eleanor E. Maccoby (ed.), The Development of Sex Differences, Stanford U.P., Stanford, 1966, pp. 25–55.

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  21. Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1980.

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  22. Cf. ‘On the logic of perception’ in Models for Modalities (Note 12 above); ‘Knowl edge by acquaintance — individuation by acquaintance’ in Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and the Known, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1974.

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  23. Cf. Aristotle, Categories, ch. 5.

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  24. Cf. Jaakko Hintikka, ‘Leibniz on plenitude, relations, and the “Reign of Law”’, in Simo Knuuttila (ed.), Reforging the Great Chain of Being, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981, pp. 259–286.

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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Hintikka, M.B., Hintikka, J. (1989). How can Language be Sexist?. In: The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic. Synthese Library, vol 200. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2647-9_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2647-9_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-0041-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2647-9

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