Phenomenology and Conceptual Psychology

  • Katherine Arens
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 113)


The tenets of conceptual psychology already elucidated in the work of Kant, Herbart, and Hermann Paul diverge from strict empiricism (such as Fechner’s and Wundt’s), and from a human science like Dilthey’s. Phenomenology, the science of the phenomena within the mind, also had to differentiate itself from this psychology, despite similarities in their procedures.


Intentional Object Mental Phenomenon Conceptual Psychology Phenomenological Reduction Empirical Psychology 
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  1. 1.
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    Husserl and Heidegger also left this out. Individual mind is not interesting to them.Google Scholar
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    Again, his contemporaries in conceptual psychology tie these together under the rubric of utility.Google Scholar
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    This is an alternative notion of objectivity, locating it behind thought, instead of tying it into environment through an intensity of presentation. For developments in this vein, see Lotze’s Logik and Mikrokosmos, op. cit., and Hans Sluga’s explication of logical objects in his book, Gottlob Frege (London: Routledge and Kegen Paul, 1980).Google Scholar
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    For the clearest definition of the phenomenological reduction, see Husserl’s The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Katherine Arens
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Germanic LanguagesUniversity of TexasAustinUSA

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