Psychological Theory and the Mind-Brain Problem
The central theme of this book is that intentional features of mind are explainable in mathematical terms, in principle. During earlier discussion a number of other issues came up which I pushed aside with the promise of doing something about them later. The mind-body problem in particular can not be avoided any longer. In the first chapter I argued against simply removing datable thoughts, pains, sensations, raw feels — in short, mental occurrents — from the concerns of scientific theory, as urged by eliminationists, and for provisionally separating mental features from occurrents and for attempting to cope with one category at a time. Mind, I said, is a system of rules, its logic, but it does not qualify as such unless the subject is able to use language and is sentient, i.e., is a living, feeling, thing. What is the relation of occurrents to automata on the one hand and to the body on the other?
KeywordsNatural Kind Identity Theory Mental Feature Psychological Theory Perceptual Belief
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.