Abstract
Aristotle was the first thinker to propose a codification of Western rationality. It is true that Plato, against whom he nevertheless reacted, preceded him on certain points. The predicative theory of judgement gives form to the proposition, while scientific and dialectic syllogistic are the modes of production of propositions. The well-known principle of non-contradiction, which is the key of all argument and of all possible discursivity is found at the foundation of logos. How can such a principle be demonstrated without putting it into practice? Aristotle is without ambiguity: such a justification cannot be furnished without begging the question, for logical demonstration rests on non-contradiction. Thus we have recourse to dialectic: Aristotle will validate his supreme principle by means of a hypothesis which brings to mind Descartes’ “Evil Genius” in that he imagines someone contradicting his principle. If this principle cannot be justified directly, it can at least be established indirectly by refuting all possible refutations. The proof ad absurdum is an example of good dialectical argument in that, through propositional complementarity, by eliminating one of the branches of the alternative A or non-A, the opposite term necessarily remains. Here we find verified that cherished idea of Aristotle’s, in which the dialectic can, in some way, be the foundation of the scientific ideal of necessity. According to Aristotle, he who opposes the principle of non-contradiction is in a bad position precisely because he practices what he expressly rejects.
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Meyer, M. (1989). Toward an Anthropology of Rhetoric. In: Meyer, M. (eds) From Metaphysics to Rhetoric. Synthese Library, vol 202. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2593-9_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2593-9_9
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