Abstract
Consumer welfare as the single goal of antitrust is analyzed by means of neoclassical microeconomics, which means that perfect competition and monopoly serve as standards of reference.1 Neither perfect competition nor monopoly in the structural sense are seen as states that should be reached. They simply serve as a basis from which to depart for the purpose of analysis and thereby should contribute to analytical clarity. The guiding concept of antitrust policy is not an ideal market structure to be reached but the maximization of consumer welfare as a performance criterion.
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References
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Schmidt, I.L.O., Rittaler, J.B. (1989). The Chicago School’s Approach to Antitrust Theory. In: A Critical Evaluation of the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis. Studies in Industrial Organization, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2567-0_4
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