Effective Epistemology, Psychology, and Artificial Intelligence
In this paper, I discuss the epistemological relevance of computation theory. First, I dispense with standard arguments against the epistemological interest of so-called “discovery methods”, which are procedures that generate good hypotheses. Then I examine the importance of computational concepts in the theory of justified belief. Finally, I compare the aims and methods of a computationally informed epistemology with those of the related fields of cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence. I conclude that artificial intelligence is most interesting when viewed as an approach to effective epistemology rather than as an adjunct to cognitive psychology.
KeywordsDiscovery Method Justify Belief Inductive Logic Rational Belief Ideal Agent
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