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Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 7))

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Abstract

The discussion of liability systems in Chapter 3 disclosed that there are many variations of the conditions for liability and, thus, many possible systems. One condition required in all the systems proposed was that of behavior on the part of some person as the occasion for liability. Even in the fictitious random system, wherein one person could be liable for the non-voluntary acts of another, it was a basic prerequisite of liability that someone did something.

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Notes

  1. W. Blackstone (1966), 4:21.

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  2. O. W. Holmes (1963), Lecture II.

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  3. A. Goldstein (1959), 405; G. Williams (1961), 2.

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  4. Husak (1987), 98.

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  5. Husak (1987), 87ff.

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  6. Husak (1987), 89ff.

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  7. J. Bentham (1948), 82.

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  8. J. Salmond (1937), 505–507. Also see Gross (1979), 134–135.

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  9. W.W.Cook (1917), 647.

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  10. Gross (1979), 56.

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  11. Gross (1979), 56.

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  12. Gross (1979), 72. See H. L. A. Hart ((1968), Ch. IV) for discussion of dualism in traditional British legal theory.

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  13. Gross (1979), 56.

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  14. See Herbert Packer for a related point about classification of personal conditions as omissions: Packer (1979), 78.

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  15. See Harris (1980), 45ff.

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  16. Jones v. U.S., 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

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  17. Loewy (1975), 141–148; Hughes (1958), 67; Jones v. U.S. (1962). Fletcher rejects this classification: Fletcher (1978), 611–622.

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  18. Fletcher (1978), 626.

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  19. Husak (1987), 100.

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  20. Fletcher (1978), 627.

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  21. See Husak (1987), 160–174.

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  22. Loewy, (1975), 142. Also see R. Abelson (1982).

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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Sistare, C.T. (1989). The Requirement of Conduct. In: Responsibility and Criminal Liability. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2440-6_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2440-6_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7601-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2440-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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