Abstract
As we have seen, the spatial determinations of the sensory input on the receptor organs is not strictly due to immediate sensations alone, i.e., their formation cannot be adequately explained by purely physiological processes. For all sensations, including the local signs, are merely empty symbols which our intellect must learn to interpret. Thus, for a sound and comprehensive theory of perception the physiologist must enter the field of psychology.1
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References
PO III 9.
Cf. PO III 4.
That Frege’s philosophy, and the ensuing tradition of analytic philosophy, is to be classified within the tradition of Western rationalism has been forcefully argued by H.D. Sluga, ‘Frege and the Rise of Analytic Philosophy’, Inquiry, 18 (1975), pp. 471–87; also id., Gottlob Frege, (London, 1980), esp. ch. II. To interpret Frege’s critique of psychologism as (somehow) linked to a basic philosophical critique directed against German Idealism, as Dummett has suggested [cf. his Frege. Philosophy of Language, (London, 1973)] is clearly to misconstrue the fundamental, strongly anti-naturalist inspiration that in fact animated Frege’s attempt at philosophical reconstruction, and which subsequently became one of the defining characteristics of Anglo-American philosophical thought during the first half of the twentieth century. As I have indicated (cf. ch. VIII), intellectual life in mid-nineteenth century Germany was dominated not by German Idealism, but rather by various brands of naturalism allowing only for philosophical positions that were scientifically informed. Helmholtz was one of the chief exponents of this philosophical movement.
PO III 567 ff.
PO III 11.
PO III 2.
SE 118 ff.; PO III 31.
PO III 533; emphasis added.
PO III 541.
Cf. Barry Stroud, Hume, (London, 1977), pp. 68–95.
“die Schlüsse der Logiker”.
WA III 553; VR II 341; cf. L. Koenigsberger (1906), p. 428.
PO III 25.
PO III 26.
VR I 354; cf. (in Piagetian terms) the child’s tertiary circular reactions towards the end of the sensori-motor period.
PO III 541.
PO III 500.
PO III 28.
HR II 52.
Ibid.
S.R. Schiffer, ‘Descartes on his Essence’, Phil. Rev. 85,1 (Jan., 1976), p. 2.
Cf. L.H. Whyte, The Unconscious Before Freud, (New York, 1960).
Cf. VR II 172–3, 233.
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), (Oxford, 1888), p. 179.
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), (Oxford, 1888), p. 183.
J.S. Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, (London, 18896), p. 323.
J.S. Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, (London, 18896), p. 323.
J. Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 2 vols. (London, 1829), I, p. 76.
P.A. Kolers, ‘Subliminal stimulation in problem-solving’, Amer. J. Psychol. 70 (1957), pp. 437–41; for a review of the literature, cf.
D.H. Raab, ‘Backward Masking’, Psychol. Bulletin 60, 2 (1963), pp. 118–29.
Cf. G. Smith, ‘Visual Perception: An Event over Time’, Psychol. Review 64, 5 (1957), pp. 306–13.
It has even been suggested that purely aesthetic grounds may sway the decision making process. Thus A.L. Austin reported to Darwin in 1877 about a curious discovery he had made. Having placed two photos of two different persons’ faces in a stereoscope—the portraits being about the same sizes, and looking about the same direction— he found that the faces blended into one in a most remarkable manner, “producing in the case of some ladies’ portraits, in every instance, a decided improvement in beauty” (quoted in John Ross, ‘The Resources of Binocular Perception’, Sci. Am. 234, 3 (March, 1976), p. 81.
Cf. Bela Julesz, ‘Texture and Visual Perception’, Sci. Am. (Febr., 1965).
John Ross (1976), p. 85.
“In den psychischen Resultanten kommt auf diese Weise ein Prinzip zur Geltung, dass wir im Hinblick auf die entstehenden Wirkungen auch als ein Prinzip schöpferischer Synthese bezeichnen können. Für die höheren geistigen Schöpfungen längst anerkannt, ist es zumeist für die Gesamtheit der übrigen psychischen Vorgänge nicht zureichend gewürdigt…worden.” [W. Wundt, Grundriss der Psychologie, (Leipzig, 1905), p. 399].
W. Köhler, ‘Die physische Gestalten’, (1920), W.D. Ellis (tr.), A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology, (London/New York, 1938), pp. 17–54.
R.L. Gregory (1974), p. XXXVIII.
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Meyering, T.C. (1989). Helmholtz’s Theory of Unconscious Inferences. In: Historical Roots of Cognitive Science. Synthese Library, vol 208. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2423-9_10
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