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Linguistic Reflexivity and ‘Pseudorationalism’

  • Chapter
Reflexive Epistemology

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 118))

Abstract

The Vienna Circle’s 1929 ‘manifesto’ was dedicated to Schlick and involved, as we have noted, the participation of Carnap. Little more than a year later Neurath opened his philosophical attack on each of these two. Earlier than this, however, in 1928, he had published in the journal of the Austrian Social Democratic Party, ‘Der Kampf, a joint review of two works by Carnap: Der logische Aufbau der Welt and Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie.1 There he portrayed Carnap as an exponent of Viennese ‘empirical rationalism’ fighting a minority battle against theology and metaphysics (and especially Kantianism) in the university schoolrooms, a battle initiated by the adherents of French enlightenment and materialism and more recently taken further by such scientists as Mach, Avenarius, Poincaré, Russell, Reichenbach and Schlick.2

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Notes

  1. Cf. Der Kampf, 21 (1928), pp. 624–6, now in GpmS, pp. 295–7.

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  2. Ibid., GpmS, pp. 295–6.

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  4. Cf. O. Neurath, Review of R. Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt, [1928a], GpmS, p. 296.

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  5. Erkenntnis, 1 (1930–31), pp. 106–25, English trans. PP, pp. 32–47.

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  6. Cf. R. Haller, ‘Geschichte und wissenschaftliches System bei Otto Neurath’, in Wittgenstein, der Wiener Kreis und der Kritische Rationalismus, p. 306.

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  8. Ibid., p. 108, PP, pp. 33–4;

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  9. cf.: O. Neurath, Empirische Soziologie, Wien: Julius Springer, 1931, now in GpmS, pp. 426–35, English trans. ES, pp. 319–421

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  10. O. Neurath, ‘Magie und Technik’, Erkenntnis, 2 (1931), pp. 529–31.

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  12. Ibid., p. 111, PP, p. 36.

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  13. Ibid., p. 123, PP, p. 46.

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  14. Ibid., p. 118, PP, p. 42.

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  15. Ibid., p. 117, PP, p. 41.

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  16. Ibid., p. 123, PP, p. 46.

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  17. Ibid., p. 108, PP, p. 34.

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  18. Ibid, loc. cit.

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  19. cf. O. Neurath, ‘Physicalism: The Philosophy of the Viennese Circle’, The Monist, 41 (1931), p. 621, now also in PP, pp. 49–50.

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  21. Ibid., loc. cit.

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  22. Ibid., p. 122, PP, p. 45

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  27. Ibid.,p. 123, PP,p.45.

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  28. Ibid., loc. cit.

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  29. Ibid., p. 107, PP, p. 33.

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  30. Ibid., p. 125, PP, p. 47.

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  31. Cf.: J. Passmore, ‘Logical Positivism’, in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5, p. 56; J. Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, London: Duckworth, 1966, pp. 367–93; K.R. Popper, ‘Autobiography’, pp. 69–71. See in addition R. Haller, ‘New Light on the Vienna Circle’, pp. 25 ff.

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  32. Cf. K.R. Popper, ‘Autobiography’, pp. 69–70.

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  33. O. Neurath, ‘Physikalismus’, Scientia, 50 (1931), now also in GpmS, pp. 417–8, English trans. PP, p. 52;

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  34. cf. O. Neurath, ‘Soziologie im Physikalismus’, Erkenntnis, 2 (1931), p. 394, English trans. PP, p. 59.

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  35. O. Neurath, ‘Wege der wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung’, [1930/31], p. 116, PP, p. 40

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  36. O. Neurath, Lebensgestaltung und Klassenkampf, Berlin: E. Laub, 1928, now in GpmS, pp. 287–93, English trans. ES, pp. 290–8

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  38. O. Neurath, ‘Physikalismus’, [1931d], GpmS, p. 418, PP, p. 53.

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  39. Ibid., loc. cit.

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  40. Ibid., loc. cit.

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  41. O. Neurath, ‘Radikaler Physikalismus und ‘Wirkliche Welt’’, Erkenntnis, 4 (1934), p. 354, English trans. PP, p. 107

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  45. Ibid., p. 396 (“man kann sich nicht über die Sprache als Ganzes sozusagen von einem ‘noch-nicht-sprachlichen’ Standpunkt aus äußern”), PP, pp. 60–1

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  47. Ibid., GpmS, p. 419, PP, p. 54.

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  48. Ibid., GpmS, p. 418 (“So werden immer Aussagen mit Aussagen verglichen, nicht etwa mit einer ‘Wirklichkeit’, mit ‘Dingen’ wie es bisher auch der Wiener Kreis tat”), PP, p. 53.

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  49. O. Neurath, Einheitswissenschaft und Psychologie, Wien: Gerold & Co, 1933, now in GpmS, p.594.

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  53. Ibid., loc. cit.

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  54. Ibid., loc. cit. (“Die hier aufgestellte Definition von ‘richtig’ und ‘unrichtig’ entfernt sich von der im ‘Wiener Kreis’ üblichen, die aus ‘Bedeutung’ und ‘Verifikation’ rekurriert”).

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  55. Cf.: O. Neurath, ‘Pseudo’, [1935a], pp. 362–3, PP, p. 129

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  58. Cf. R. Carnap, ‘Intellectual Autobiography’, pp. 60–2. At the First International Congress for the Unity of Science, organised by Neurath in Paris (1935), Carnap took sides with Tarski’s against Neurath, who together with Årne Naess had criticized Tarski’s paper ‘Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik’ (see Actes du Congrés International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris, 1935, Actualités Scientifiques et Industrielles, no. 290, Paris: Hermann & Cie Editeurs, 1936, III, pp. 1–8; cf.: R. Carnap, ‘Wahrheit und Bewährung’, ibid., IV, pp. 18–23; R. Carnap, ‘Intellectual Autobiography’, p. 61.

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  59. Cf.: C.G. Hempel, ‘Studies in the Logic of Confirmation’, Mind, 54 (1945), p. 115

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  60. C.G. Hempel, ‘Le problème de la vérité’, Theoria, 3 (1937), pp. 225–8.

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  61. Cf. K.R. Popper, ‘Autobiography’, pp. 70, 78, 114; K.R. Popper, ‘Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge’, in Conjectures and Refutations, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969, pp. 223–7. Popper’s interpretation of Tarski’s semantic theory of truth has been criticized by S. Haack, in Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978; see also T.S. Kuhn, ‘Reflections on My Critics’, in I. Lakatos, A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, p. 265.

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  62. Cf. O. Neurath, ‘Erster Internationaler Kongreß für Einheit der Wissenschaft in Paris 1935’, Erkenntnis, 5 (1935), pp. 395–402; A. Tarski, ‘The Semantic Conception of Truth’, in H. Feigl, W. Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis, p. 80, note 3 (with reference to Neurath’s criticism). Many others after Neurath have criticized Tarski’s formalization of the semantic concept of truth: for instance F. Gonseth, H. Reichenbach, F. Kaufmann, M. Black, G.C. Field and, more recently

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  63. , H. Putnam, in Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, pp.vii, 1–6, 9–17, 28–32.

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  64. O. Neurath, ‘Einzelwissenschaften, EinheitsWissenschaft, Pseudorationalismus’, in Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Sorbonne, Paris 1935, I, Actualités Scientifiques et Industrielles, no. 388, Paris 1936, now in GpmS, pp. 706–7, English trans. PP, pp. 135–6

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  67. O. Neurath, Foundations, [1944a], pp. 12–3.

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  68. Ibid., loc. cit. This aspect has been particularly emphasised by F. Kaufmann; see Carnap’s reply to Kaufmann’s criticism in Introduction to Semantics, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1942; cf. H. Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences, pp. 2–3.

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  70. O. Neurath, Foundations, [1944a], pp. 12–3,48, note 19.

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  71. Cf. L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961, 4.25, 4.26, 4.3.

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  72. See C.G. Hempel, ‘Schlick und Neurath: Fundierung versus Kohärenz in der wissenschfatlichen Erkenntnis’. See in addition: H. Rutte, ‘Neurath kontra Schlick. Zur Wahrheitsdiskussion im Wiener Kreis’, in Wittgenstein, der Wiener Kreis und der Kritische Rationalismus, pp. 248–51; T. Oberdan, ‘Neurath’s Complaint’, ibid., pp. 241–3; H. Rutte, Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982.

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  73. Cf. M. Schlick, ‘Positivismus und Realismus’, Erkenntnis, 3 (1932–33), pp. 7, 29.

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  74. In Erkenntnis, 2 (1931), pp. 432–65; ibid., 3 (1932–33), pp. 107–42.

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  75. Cf. B. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1926. W.V.O. Quine has pointed out the relationship between the two books

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  76. cf.: W.V.O. Quine, ‘Russell’s Ontological Development’, Journal of Philosophy, 63 (1966), pp. 107–42; W.V.O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, p. 74. For a recent reinterpretation of Carnap’s Aufbau, with references to Neurath and Quine’s ontological relativism

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  77. see A. Coffa, ‘Idealism and the Aufbau’, in N. Rescher (ed.), The Heritage of Logical Positivism, Lanham (Md.): University Press of America, 1985, pp. 133–55.

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  78. R. Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt, Berlin and Schlachtensee: Weltkreis Verlag, 1928, p. 105, English trans. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

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  79. R. Carnap, ‘Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft’, Erkenntnis, 2 (1931), pp. 437, 438.

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  80. Ibid., p. 438.

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  81. Cf. K.R. Popper, Logik der Forschung, pp. 51–55, English trans, pp. 93–7. See also G. Andersson, ‘How to Accept Fallible Test Statements? Popper’s Criticist Solution’, in G. Andersson (ed.), Rationality in Science and Politics, Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1985, pp. 47–65.

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  82. O. Neurath, ‘Protokollsätze’, Erkenntnis, 3 (1932–33), p. 206 (“Es gibt kein Mittel, um endgültig gesicherte saubere Protokollsätze zum Ausgangspunkt der Wissenschaften zu machen. Es gibt keine tabula rasa”), English trans. PP, p. 92.

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  83. Cf. R. Carnap, ‘Intellectual Autobiography’, p. 38.

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  84. Cf.: W.V.O. Quine, ‘Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis’, now in W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, p. 79 (“The philosopher’s task was well compared by Neurath to that of a mariner who must rebuild his ship on the open sea”); W.V.O. Quine, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, p. 210 (“As Neurath has said, we are in the position of a mariner who must rebuild his ship plank by plank while continuing to stay afloat on the open sea”), pp. 212–3 (“Epistemologists have wanted to posit a realm of sense data, [...] for fear of circularity [...]. But if with Neurath we accept this circularity, simply recognizing that the science of science is a science, then we dispose of the epistemological motive for assuming a realm of sense data”); W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object, p. 3 (“Neurath has likened science to a boat which, if we are to rebuild it, we must rebuild plank by plank while staying afloat in it. The philosopher and the scientist are in the same boat.”), pp. 123–4 (“The interlocked conceptual scheme of physical objects, identity and divided reference is part of the ship which, in Neurath’s figure, we cannot remodel save as we stay afloat on it. The ontology of abstract objects is part of the ship too, if only a less fundamental part. The ship may owe its structure partly to blundering predecessors who missed scuttling it only by fools’ luck. But we are not in a position to jettison any part of it, except as we have substitute devices ready to hand that will serve the same essential purposes”), p. 210; W.V.O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, pp. 83–4 (“This interplay is reminiscent again of the old threat of circularity, but it is all right now that we have stopped dreaming of deducing science from sense data. We are after an understanding of science as an institution or process in the world, and we do not intend that understanding to be any better than the science which is its object. This attitude is indeed one that Neurath was already urging in Vienna Circle days, with his parable of the mariner who has to rebuild his boat while staying afloat in it”), pp. 126–7 (“I see philosophy and science as in the same boat — a boat which, to revert to Neurath’s figure as I so often do, we can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. There is no external vantage point, no first philosophy”).

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  85. O. Neurath, ‘Protokollsätze’, [1932/33], p. 206 (“Wie Schiffer sind wir, die ihr Schiff auf offener See umbauen müssen, ohne es jemals in einem Dock zerlegen und aus besten Bestandteilen neu errichten zu können”), PP, p. 92.

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  86. O. Neurath, ‘Protokollsätze’, [1932/33], p. 208, PP, p. 94.

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  87. Ibid., loc. cit. This thesis has been developed by I. Lakatos with reference to fundamental concepts of mathematics in Proofs and Refutations. The Logic of Mathematical Discovery, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

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  88. O. Neurath, ‘Protokollsätze’, [1932/33], pp. 209–10, PP, pp. 95–6. Cf. R. Haller, ‘Das Neurath-Prinzip. Grundlagen und Folgerungen’, passim. C.G. Hempel, in ‘Schlick und Neurath: Fundierung versus Kohärenz in der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis’, pp. 8–9, emphasises the importance of this ‘principle’ and recognizes its historical primacy with respect to Carnap and Popper’s similar theses.

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  90. Ibid., loc. cit.

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  91. According to J. Passmore “Reichenbach once wrote of Carnap that ‘his theory may be regarded, after a fashion, as a modern fulfilment of Descartes’ quest for an absolutely certain basis of science’. In so far as that was his ambition, most logical positivists would now admit, he certainly failed to fulfil it” (A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 393).

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  92. O. Neurath, ‘Protokollsätze’, [1932/33], pp. 211–2, PP, pp. 96–7. “If someone makes predictions and wants to check them himself, he must count on changes in the system of his senses, he must use clocks and rulers; in short the man who supposedly is in isolation already makes use of the ‘intersensual’ and ‘intersubjective’ language. The forecaster of yesterday and the controller of today are, so to speak, two persons” (O. Neurath, ‘Physikalismus’, [1931d], GpmS, p. 420, PP, p. 55).

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  94. O. Neurath, ‘Protokollsätze’, [1932/33], pp. 206–8, 210–1, PP, pp. 93–4, 95–6.

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  95. Ibid., p. 210, PP, p. 96.

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  96. Ibid., loc. cit.

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  97. Ibid., pp. 210–2, PP, pp. 96–7.

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  98. Ibid., p. 210, PP, p. 96.

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  99. O. Neurath, ‘Physikalismus’, [1931d], GpmS, p. 418, PP, p. 53.

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  100. Cf. W.V.O. Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, Philosphical Review, 60 (1951), pp. 20–43, now in W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, pp. 20–46. And yet Quine seems not to recognise the importance of Neurath’s contribution on this subject: cf. W.V.O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, p. 85.

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  101. Cf.: R. Carnap, ‘Die neue und die alte Logik’, Erkenntnis, 1 (1930–31), pp. 12–26

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  102. R. Carnap, ‘Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache’, ibid., 2 (1931), pp. 219–41. On the relationship between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and Neurath’s thought see F. Wallner, ‘Wittgenstein und Neurath. Vergleich von Intentionen und Denkstil’, in Schlick und Neurath. Ein Symposion, ed. by R. Haller, pp. 419–23.

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  105. R. Camap, ‘Die neue und die alte Logik’, pp. 21–3; see the discussion between Carnap and Quine in the Fifties: W.V.O. Quine, ‘Carnap and Logical Truth’, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, pp. 385–406; R. Carnap, ‘W.V.O. Quine on Logical Truth’, ibid., pp. 915–22. See also W.V.O. Quine, ‘On Carnap’s Views on Ontology’, Philosophical Studies, 2 (1951), n. 5, pp. 65–72.

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  106. Cf. K.R. Popper, ‘The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics’, in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, pp. 183–226, and Carnap’s reply ‘K.R. Popper and the Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics’, ibid., pp. 877–81.

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  108. Cf. W.V.O. Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’; see also M.G. White, ‘The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism’, in L. Linsky (ed.), Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1952, pp. 272–86.

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  111. O. Neurath, Einheitswissenschaft und Psychologie, [1933], GpmS, p. 506.

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  112. O. Neurath, Le développement du Cercle de Vienne et l’avenir de l’empirisme logique, [1936], pp. 56–7.

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  113. O. Neurath, ‘Protokollsätze’, [1932/33], p. 204, PP, p. 91.

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  114. Ibid., loc. cit.

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  115. Ibid., p. 205, PP, p. 91.

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  116. Cf. A. Gargani, Introduzione a Wittgenstein, Roma and Bari: Laterza, 1973, pp. 79–91.

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  117. O. Neurath, ‘Protokollsätze’, [1932/33], p. 206 (“Wird die Unpräzision an einer Stelle verringert, kann sie wohl gar an anderer Stelle verstärkt wieder auftreten”), PP, pp. 92 f.

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  118. O. Neurath, ‘L’encyclopédie comme ‘modèle’, Revue de Synthèse, 12 (1936), n. 2, p. 188, English trans. PP, p. 146

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  119. O. Neurath, ‘Radikaler Physikalismus und ‘Wirkliche Welt’’, [1934], pp. 350–1, PP, pp. 103–4.

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  120. Ibid., p. 351, PP, p. 104

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  121. O. Neurath, ‘L’encyclopédie comme ‘modèle’, [1936d], pp. 188–9, PP, pp. 146–7.

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  122. O. Neurath, ‘Radikaler Physikalismus und ‘Wirkliche Welt’’, [1934], p. 351, PP, p. 104.

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  123. Neurath quotes Karl Menger’s essay ‘Die neue Logik’, in K. Menger, Krise und Neuaufbau in den exacten Wissenschaften, Leipzig und Wien: Deutike, 1933, pp. 107, 119.

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  136. Ibid., pp. 84 ff. On the relationship between Schlick and Neurath see: K. Lehrer, ‘Schlick and Neurath: Meaning and Truth’, in R. Haller (ed.), Schlick und Neurath, Ein Symposion, pp. 49–61; R. Hilpinen, ‘Schlick on the Foundation of Knowledge’, ibid., pp. 63–78; W. Leinfellner, ‘Schlicks kognitive Erkenntnistheorie als Wissenschaftstheorie’, ibid., pp. 103–27; H. Lauener, ‘Neurath’s Protocol Sentences and Schlick’s ‘Konstatierungen’ versus Quine’s Observation Sentences’, ibid., pp. 129–48; H. Tennessen, ‘Qualms about Otto Neurath’s Cabby Language’, ibid., pp. 385–98; J. Dvorak, ‘Wahrscheinlichkeit, Logik und Empirie: Neurath, Schlick, und Zilsel’, ibid., pp. 465–70; D. Davidson, ‘Empirical Content’, ibid., pp. 471–89; O. Hänfling, Logical Positivism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981, pp. 82–6.

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  143. T. Vogel, ‘Bemerkungen zur Aussagentheorie des Radikalen Physikalismus’, ibid., pp. 160–4. In his recent essay, ‘Schlick und Neurath: Fundierung versus Kohärenz in der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis’, p. 17, Hempel recognises that Neurath’s thesis cannot be understood as ‘eine reine Kohärenzauffassung’.

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  144. Cf.: A.J. Ayer, ‘Verification and Experience’, in A.J. Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism, Glencoe (Ill): The Free Press, 1959

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  146. Cf. B. Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, London: Allen & Unwin, 1950.

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  148. Cf. V. Kraft, ‘Popper and the Vienna Circle’, in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper, pp. 185–201, particularly p. 194.

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  149. Cf. I. Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967, pp. 91–123.

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  150. Cf. J. Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 376 (“Thus Neurath’s attack on metaphysics leads him back to that coherence theory of truth already familiar to us in the writings of the Absolute Idealists — not surprisingly, since for them, too, ‘transcendence’ was the great enemy”).

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  151. Cf. I. Lakatos, ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, pp. 113–4.

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  152. In his reply to R.S. Cohen’s criticism (‘Robert S. Cohen on the Relationship between Dialectical Materialism and Empiricism’) Carnap maintains that Neurath’s formulation of the theory of non-transcendability of linguistic propositions was ‘misleading’, but it did not imply any ‘coherence theory’ of truth. (It is, by the way, worth mentioning that, while defending Neurath from the charge of nominalism, Carnap seems to be inclined to attribute to him a sort of epistemological realism, precisely akin to his own implicit realism). According to Carnap Neurath’s formulations “were indeed repeatedly interpreted in this sense, not only by outsiders like Russell and Ayer, but also by Schlick. Neurath vehemently rejected this interpretation in the discussions of the Vienna Circle, and also in a remark in his report on the Paris Congress of 1935 (Erkenntnis, 5, 1936, p. 400). At any rate, there cannot be any doubt that Neurath never held this conception” (P.A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, p. 864). As to Neurath’s remark mentioned by Carnap, cf. O. Neurath, ‘Erster Internationaler Kongress für Einheit der Wissenschaft in Paris 1935’, [1935c], p. 400;

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  155. Ibid., p. 231.

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  157. Ibid., pp. 148–9.

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  158. According to Lakatos Neurath’s reply (in ‘Pseudorationalismus der Falsifikation’) to Popper’s criticism shows that Neurath “never grasped Popper’s simple argument” (cf. I. Lakatos, ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, p. 114).

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  159. In Einheitswissenschaft und Psychologie, GpmS, p. 591, Neurath openly maintains the identity between ‘Physikalismus’ and ‘räumlichzeitliche Terminologie’.

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  160. Cf. F. Barone, Il neopositivismo logico, pp. 310–1, 314; G. Statera, Logica, linguaggio e sociologia. Studio su Otto Neurath e il neopositivismo, pp. 48–9.

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  161. Cf. L. Fleck, Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache. Einführung in die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv, Basel: Benno Schwabe, 1935

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  162. see also: T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, p. x

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  165. Ibid., p. 348, PP, pp. 101–2

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  168. Cf.: B. Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p. 139; O. Neurath, ‘Universal Jargon and Terminology’, [1941], pp. 146–8, PP, pp. 228–9.

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  170. Ibid., p. 348, PP, p. 102.

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  171. Ibid., p. 352 (“Unter den miteinender konkurrierenden Satzsystemen wählen wir ein aus. Dies so ausgewählte Satzsystem ist aber nicht logisch ausgezeichnet”), PP, p. 105; O. Neurath, ‘Einheit der Wissenschaft als Aufgabe’, [1935], p. 20 (“Aber solche Eindeutigkeit des Entschlusses und der Tat ist nicht logisches Ergebnis aus irgendwelchen Prämissen, die zu einer einzigen Prognose über den Erfolg der Tat führen”), PP, p. 118.

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  174. Cf.: O. Neurath, ‘Radikaler Physikalismus und ‘Wirkilche Welt’’, [1934], p. 353 (“Aber ‘unserer Standpunkt’ ist dennoch nur historisch bestimmt”), PP, p. 106;

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  175. ibid., p. 356 (“Die Termini ‘Satz’, ‘Sprache’ usw. müssen historisch-soziologisch definiert werden”), PP, p. 108

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  177. Ibid., loc. cit.

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  185. Ibid., p. 19, PP, p. 117. The analogy between these elements of sociology of science and some central theses of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions may be found surprising; cf. R. Hegselmann, ‘Otto Neurath. Empiristischer Aufklärer und Sozialreformer’, pp. 40–1.

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  190. Ibid., p. 17, PP, p. 115.

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  198. Ibid., loc. cit.

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    Danilo Zolo

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Zolo, D. (1989). Linguistic Reflexivity and ‘Pseudorationalism’. In: Reflexive Epistemology. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 118. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2415-4_3

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