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Reflections on Conceptual Openness and Conceptual Tension

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Freedom and Rationality

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 117))

Abstract

Readers of a Festschrift honoring J.W.N. Watkins will surely know that once upon a time there raged a hotly-debated argument over whether the concepts used in the social sciences are individualistic or not. Having not long ago reread that debate as it was preserved by John O’Neill,1 I find myself thinking that the non-individualist papers are hardly the worse for wear, and that the individualist ones no more persuasive now than then. But I have had my say on all that in the terms in which I understood the debate and have no desire to repeat again what I said all those years ago. I would, however, like to indicate something about the nature of the problem from a perspective that was very far from my mind in those earlier years when the debate was taking place, that is, from a perspective that I have come to think of as conceptual tension.

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Notes

  1. John O’Neill (Ed.), Modes of Individualism and Collectivism, London, Heinemann Educational Books, 1973.

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  2. Quoted in Morris Weitz, The Opening Mind, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1977, p. xi.

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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Goldstein, L.J. (1989). Reflections on Conceptual Openness and Conceptual Tension. In: D’Agostino, F., Jarvie, I.C. (eds) Freedom and Rationality. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 117. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2380-5_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2380-5_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7571-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2380-5

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