Abstract
In Chapter 7 of his Science and Scepticism on ‘The Empirical Basis’, John Watkins addresses one of the most serious difficulties confronting Popper’s philosophy of science. As is well-known, Popper’s methodology rests on a demarcation criterion according to which only empirically refutable propositions count as scientific.1 This criterion arises from the asymmetry, in regard to scientific hypotheses, between verification and falsification. While such hypotheses are taken to be universal statements subsuming infinitely many states of affairs, their potential falsifiers (basic statements) are singular sentences. One is thereby led to believe that the impossibility of verification has to do with the (physical) impossibility of performing infinitely many operations; while the possibility of falsification rests on the possibility — at least in principle — of making finitely many observations in order to decide the truth-value of a basic statement. However, both in his (1930/31) and in his (1934), Popper goes out of his way to assert that observation, as commonly understood, namely as a process grounded in perception, bears no epistemological relation to basic statements.2 Sense-experience may motivate or cause us to accept a falsifier but it provides no reason for doing so. Potential falsifiers can be and in fact usually are objective statements about the external world.
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Notes
Popper, K.R.: 1934, Logik der Forschung (Springer, Wien), Chapter 1.
Popper, K.R.: 1934, p. 29
Popper, K.R.: 1930/31, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie (Mohr-Siebeck, Tubingen), p. 11.
Popper, K.R.: 1930/31, p. 132 (p. 11).
Watkins, J.W.N.: 1984, Science and Scepticism (Princeton University Press, Princeton), p. 72.
Zahar, E.G.: 1982, ‘The Popper-Lakatos Controversy’ (Fundamenta Scientiae, 3, No. 1), pp. 21–54. Especially p. 11.
Brentano, F.: 1925, Versuch über die Erkenntnis (Felix Meiner, Hamburg), Section 2.
Popper, K.R.: 1930/31, p. 121.
Brentano, F.: 1924, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Felix Meiner, Hamburg), Vol. I, Book 2, Chapter 2.
Husserl was later to adopt Brentano’s early view. As is well-known, Husserl wanted all logical operators to be both objective and man-made; so he felt he had no option save to look upon all logical and mathematical entities as existent, though ideal, intentional objects. Cf. Husserl, E.: 1948, Erfahrung und Urteil (Felix Meiner, Hamburg), Section II.
Brentano, F.: 1924, Vol. 3, Chapters 4 and 5.
Zahar, E.G.: 1973, ‘Why did Einstein’s Programme Supersede Lorentz’s?’ (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 24), p. 11
Worrall, J.: 1978, ‘Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in Radnitzky, G. and Andersson, G. (Eds.): Progress and Rationality in Science (Reidel, Dordrecht).
Zahar, E.G.: 1980, ‘Einstein, Meyerson and The Role of Mathematics in Physical Discovery’ (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 31), pp. 1–43.
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Zahar, E. (1989). John Watkins on the Empirical Basis and the Corroboration of Scientific Theories. In: D’Agostino, F., Jarvie, I.C. (eds) Freedom and Rationality. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 117. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2380-5_18
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