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The ‘Optimum’ Aim for Science

  • Fred D’Agostino
Chapter
  • 103 Downloads
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 117)

Abstract

In his book Science and Scepticism1 John Watkins proposes to defeat the ‘rationality-sceptic’ within the limits defined by Humean scepticism about the possibility of knowledge of the world of external objects and of future events. Rationality-scepticism is according to Watkins (p. 59) that view — advocated perhaps and if so most prominently in recent discussions by Paul Feyerabend2 — that “we never have any good reason to adopt a hypothesis about the external world” — or, perhaps more clearly, that we never have any good reason to adopt from amongst those available any particular hypothesis.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    London: Hutchinson, 1984.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    See Feyerabend, Against Method (London: New Left Books, 1975).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fred D’Agostino
    • 1
  1. 1.University of New EnglandUSA

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