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On Kant’s Refutation of Metaphysics

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Philosophy and the Liberal Arts

Part of the book series: Contributions To Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 2))

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Abstract

One way to proceed to the Kantian dialectic which would follow quite appropriately upon the two preceding essays would be to consider whether the General Theory of Relativity can be accommodated within his philosophy. I do not, however, possess the technical mathematical and physical knowledge to grapple successfully with this theory. Hence, I must forego this route. Kant himself, though, carried his dialectic in another direction: toward a negative criticism of the tradition. And this is the way we shall proceed.

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Notes

  1. Prosologium, cap. IV, Patrologia Latina, Migne, CLVIII, p. 229.

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  2. Ibid. cap. II, p. 228.

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  3. Ibid. cap. IV, p. 229, “Ita igitur, nemo intelligens id quod Deus est, potest cogitare quia Deus non est.”

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  4. Liber Apologeticus, cap. V, Patrologia Latina, Migne, CLVIII, p. 225.

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  5. Ibid. cap. VIII.

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  6. Ibid. cap. I.

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  7. On this topic see the excellent book by Robert Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982) especially chapters 1 and 9, where it is made quite clear that Anselm’s main concern is with the nature of that unique res which is God.

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  8. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1933), (hereafter CPR), A607, B635; A629, B657.

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  9. CPR. A600f.; B628f. In the Anselmian or Cartesian versions of the ontological argument, the notion of reality is intended to bring the knower into cognitive relation with a being, and in this instance, a being whose intelligibility and independent reality mutually imply each other. This point is informatively discussed and its connection with the Kantian criticism indicated by Fr. G. Miller in “The Ontological Argument in St. Anselm and Descartes,” The Modern Schoolman, XXXII (1954), pp. 341–49

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  10. XXXIII (1955), pp. 31–8.

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  11. Also see John Sallis, The Gathering of Reason (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1980), Chap. V.

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  12. Cf. my essay referred to in note # 11 above.

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  13. Principles, I, (Adam and Tannery), VII, pp. 24ff.

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  14. See Principles, loc. cit. See also my Philosophy at the Crossroads (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1971), sec. 13f. Descartes explicitly rejects the analogy of God to other beings, but Descartes’ thought was not at one with itself on these matters.

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  15. , Critique of Judgment, trans. J.C. Meredith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952) (hereafter C. J.) p. 363. Note also his interpretation of Plato in CPR, A4; B8. Note also A50; B74.

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  16. “L’idée de Dieu soit tellement emprainte en l’esprit humain, qu’il n’y ait personne qui n’ait ensoy la faculté de le connoistre.” Ltr. à Clerselier, Adam and Tannery, IV, pp. 187–8, italics the author’s. Cf. Regulae, IV.

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  17. “Habet enim humana mens nescio quid divini, in quo prima cogitationum utilium semina ita inacta sunt, ut saepe, quantumvis neglecta et transversis studiis suffocata spontaneum frugem producant.” Regulae IV, Adam & Tannery, X, 373.

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  18. Kant may not have successfully escaped paradox on this score. The question is whether or not sensations are given to the mind’s receptivity totally without form. If they are given entirely without form — as the purely passive material of knowledge — then it would seem that they could receive any form whatsoever; hence, whatever form was imposed on them by the mind would be imposed arbitrarily. This is the impositional interpretation which Kant wished to avoid. On the other hand, if sensations are given to the mind with some form and order of their own, then his idealism would have to be relinquished. E. Boutroux makes this point quite clearly, La Philosophie de Kant, (Paris, 1926), p. 102.

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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Ballard, E.G. (1989). On Kant’s Refutation of Metaphysics. In: Philosophy and the Liberal Arts. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2368-3_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2368-3_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7566-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2368-3

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