BonJour’s The Structure of Empirical Knowledge

  • Alvin I. Goldman
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 44)


The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (BonJour, 1985) is a detailed and subtle defense of a coherentist account of epistemic justification. It can plausibly be claimed that it is unsurpassed, in thoroughness and sophistication, by any other sympathetic treatment of coherentism. Nonetheless, there are in my view serious problems with some of the book’s central theses. This discussion will concentrate on several of the problem areas that I take to be crucial to BonJour’s position.


Empirical Knowledge Justify Belief Epistemic Justification Correct Standard Empirical Justification 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alvin I. Goldman
    • 1
  1. 1.University of ArizonaUSA

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