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How Reasonable is Lehrer’s Coherence Theory? Beats Me.

  • Philip Peterson
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 44)

Abstract

I shall briefly review Lehrer’s theory of knowledge (in Section I) and then criticize his treatment of a priori knowledge (Section II) and extend that criticism to his general account (Sections III and IV). My understanding of Lehrer’s theory is based on Lehrer 1974, 1981a, 1981b, 1982, 1983, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, and 1988.

Keywords

Tacit Knowledge Acceptance System Probability Judgment Epistemic Evaluation Intuitive Knowledge 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Philip Peterson
    • 1
  1. 1.Syracuse UniversityUSA

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