Abstract
I shall briefly review Lehrer’s theory of knowledge (in Section I) and then criticize his treatment of a priori knowledge (Section II) and extend that criticism to his general account (Sections III and IV). My understanding of Lehrer’s theory is based on Lehrer 1974, 1981a, 1981b, 1982, 1983, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, and 1988.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Alston, William. “Two Types of Foundationalism.” Journal of Philosophy, 73 (1976), 165–185.
Armstrong, D. M. Belief, Truth, and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
Chisholm, Roderick. The Theory of Knowledge. Second Edition, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977.
Chomsky, Noam. Language and Mind. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1968.
Chomsky, Noam. Reflections on Language. Pantheon, 1975.
Chomsky, Noam. Rules and Representations. Columbia University Press, 1980.
Dretske, Fred. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981.
Goldman, Alvin., Chomsky, Noam. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.
Lehrer, Keith. Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974.
Goldman, Alvin. and Wagner, Carl. (1981a) Rational Consensus in Science and Society. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Goldman, Alvin. “A Self-Profile.” (1981b) In Keith Lehrer R. J. Bogdan, ed., Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Goldman, Alvin. “Knowledge, Truth, and Ontology.” In Language and Ontology. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1982.
Goldman, Alvin. and Cohen, Stewart. “Justification, Truth, and Coherence.” Synthese, 55 (1983), 191–207.
Goldman, Alvin. “The Coherence Theory of Knowledge.” (1986a). Philosophical Topics, 14(1), 5–25.
Goldman, Alvin. “Metamind: Belief, Consciousness, and Intentionality.” (1986b). In Belief: Form, Content, and Function, R. J. Bodgan, ed., Clarendon Press.
Goldman, Alvin. Lectures on Knowledge. (1986c). NEH Institute on the Theory of Knowledge, University of Colorado, Boulder, June 16–19, July 10, August 7–8.
Goldman, Alvin. “Metaknowledge: Undefeated Justification.” Synthese, 74, (1988), 329–347.
Malcolm, Norman. “Knowledge and Belief.” In Phillips Griffiths 1967.
Nagel, Thomas. “Linguistics and Epistemology.” In Language and Philosophy, S. Hook, ed.. New York: New York University Press, 1969.
Peterson, P. L. “How to Infer Belief from Knowledge.” Philosophical Studies, 32 (1977), 203–209.
Peterson, P. L. “On Lehrer’s Proof that Knowledge Entails Belief.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 21 (1983), 271–79.
Peterson, P. L. “Real Logic in Philosophy.” The Monist, 69(2) (1986) 236–263.
Phillips Griffiths, A., ed. Knowledge and Belief. Oxford University Press, 1967.
Prichard, H. “Knowing and Believing.” In Phillips Griffiths, 1967.
Shope, R. K. The Analysis of Knowing. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Peterson, P. (1989). How Reasonable is Lehrer’s Coherence Theory? Beats Me.. In: Bender, J.W. (eds) The Current State of the Coherence Theory. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 44. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2360-7_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2360-7_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7563-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2360-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive