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Lehrer’s Coherentism and the Isolation Objection

  • Paul K. Moser
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 44)

Abstract

Among coherence theories of epistemic justification, Keith Lehrer’s version is second to none in its originality, detail, and precision. It is, without a doubt, the most refined coherence theory in circulation. In this paper I ask whether Lehrer’s coherentism withstands the familiar isolation objection to epistemic coherentism. Part 1 outlines Lehrer’s coherentism in its most recent garb. Part 2 states the isolation objection to coherentism without relying on the troublesome metaphor of “cutting off” empirical justification from the world. And Part 3 argues that Lehrer’s coherentism falls prey to the isolation objection because of a deficiency shared by all versions of epistemic coherentism.1

Keywords

Justify Belief Perceptual State Verific System Epistemic Justification Acceptance System 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul K. Moser
    • 1
  1. 1.Loyola University of ChicagoUSA

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