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Equilibrium in Coherence?

  • Ernest Sosa
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 44)

Abstract

The method of reflective equilibrium aims to maximize two factors in one’s beliefs: harmonious coherence, and plausibility of content.1 Analytic philosophy has long paid deference to these factors, for instance in its use of the counterexample, which attacks a principle as incoherent with the plausible (by one’s lights). A critique of this tradition has recently appeared, and it shall be my main objective here to assess its merits. An appendix will apply our results to issues of moral relativism and rationality.

Keywords

Inductive Inference Elementary Logic Reflective Equilibrium Intellectual Virtue Rational Justification 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ernest Sosa
    • 1
  1. 1.Brown UniversityUSA

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