Epistemically Justified Opinion

  • Bruce Aune
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 44)


The theories of epistemic justification advanced in recent years are commonly offered as contributions to an adequate conception of knowledge and are, perhaps in consequence, either foundational or coherentist.1 I take exception to such theories here, arguing that they exaggerate the importance of knowledge for an adequate epistemology. I claim that an adequate epistemology requires a central concept of epistemic justification not subordinate to the concept of knowledge and that the needed concept (which I attempt to identify) should presupppose a new theory of empirical justification — one that is neither foundational nor coherentist. Since the theory I accept has interesting affinities with the coherence theory recently developed by Laurence BonJour,2 I comment freely on his theory in supporting my alternative.


Good Explanation General Belief Conceptual Scheme Inductive Rule Epistemic Standard 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. Aune, Bruce. Rationalism, Empiricism, and Pragmatism. New York: Random House, 1970.Google Scholar
  2. Aune, Bruce. Metaphysics: The Elements. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985.Google Scholar
  3. Aune, Bruce. “Epistemic Justification,” Philosophical Studies 40 (1981), 419–429.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Aune, Bruce. “Action and Ontology,” Philosophical Studies, forthcoming (1988).Google Scholar
  5. Bergmann, Gustav. The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1954.Google Scholar
  6. Binkley, Robert. “A Theory of Practical Reason,” Philosophical Review 74 (1965), 423–448.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. BonJour, Laurence. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985.Google Scholar
  8. Clifford, W. K. “The Ethics of Belief,” (1859), cited, in part, in A. Castell (1963), 62–64.Google Scholar
  9. Castell, Aubrey. A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, second edition, New York: Macmillan, 1963.Google Scholar
  10. Davidson, Donald. “The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” in Davidson, Essays into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, 183–198.Google Scholar
  11. de Finetti, Bruno: 1937, Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources, trans, by H.E. Kyburg, in H.E. Kyburg & H.E. Smokier (1964), 93–158.Google Scholar
  12. Elgin, Catherine. “The Epistemic Efficacy of Stupidity,” in Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin (1988), 135–152.Google Scholar
  13. Goodman, N. and C. Elgin. Reconceptions in Philosophy, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988.Google Scholar
  14. Glymour, Clark. Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.Google Scholar
  15. Hardin, C.L. Color for Philosophers. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986.Google Scholar
  16. Herbert, Nick. Quantum Reality. New York: Doubleday, 1987.Google Scholar
  17. Kyburg, H.E., and H.E. Smokier. Studies in Subjective Probability. New York: Wiley, 1964.Google Scholar
  18. Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. (1859). Many editions.Google Scholar
  19. Phillips, Lawrence, D. Bayesian Statistics for Social Scientists. London: Nelson, 1973.Google Scholar
  20. Putnam, Hilary. Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Ramsey, Frank P. “Truth and Probability,” in Kyburg and Smokier (1964), 61–92.Google Scholar
  22. Rosenkrantz, Roger. Inference, Method and Decision. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977.Google Scholar
  23. Russell, Bertrand. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. London: Allen and Unwin, 1948.Google Scholar
  24. Russell, Bertrand. My Philosophical Development. London: Allen & Unwin, 1959.Google Scholar
  25. Salmon, Wesley. The Foundations of Scientific Inference. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967.Google Scholar
  26. Schiffer, Stephen. The Remnants of Meaning. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987.Google Scholar
  27. Skyrms, Brian. Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic. Encino, Calif.: Dickinson, 1975.Google Scholar
  28. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus trans. W.K. Ogden, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bruce Aune
    • 1
  1. 1.University of MassachusettsUSA

Personalised recommendations