• Carolyn Black
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 44)


In his recent book, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Laurence BonJour advocates a coherentist view of knowledge and justification, arguing that there is a fatal problem with the purportedly basic beliefs of the foundationalist.1 Barring skepticism, BonJour contends, coherentism is the only even potentially adequate account of empirical knowledge. Keith Lehrer, a long-time committed coherentist, also finds the basic beliefs of the foundationalist wanting: “The problem with the foundation theory is that it does not provide us with any explanation of why we should accept the postulates, when, in fact, it is perfectly clear why we accept those postulates. The reason is that we think that the beliefs in question are very probably true...”2


Empirical Knowledge Knowledge Claim Basic Belief Infinite Regress Coherence Theory 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carolyn Black
    • 1
  1. 1.San Jose State UniversityUSA

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