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BonJour’s Anti-Foundationalist Argument

  • Matthias Steup
Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 44)

Abstract

Philosophers who reject foundationalism affirm either that there is not, or that there cannot be, a foundation of knowledge. A typical argument in support of the former claim runs as follows. For there to be a foundation of knowledge, there would have to be a sufficient number of beliefs that enjoy an evidential privilege such as infallibility, indubitability, or incorrigibility. For only by virtue of possessing such an evidential privilege could a belief be an instance of direct knowledge and then serve as a foundation forindirect knowledge. However, as a matter of psychological fact, far too few beliefs meet this condition for there to be a sufficient number of foundational beliefs. Hence indirect knowledge does not rest on any foundation.1

Keywords

Justify Belief Basic Belief Representational Content Epistemic Justification Epistemic Evaluation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Matthias Steup
    • 1
  1. 1.The University of WyomingUSA

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