Coherence, Justification, and Knowledge: The Current Debate

  • John W. Bender
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 44)


Despite Emerson’s maxim associating consistency with little minds, no philosopher champions incoherence, and this is how it should be. Since the most basic virtue of a belief is that it be knowledge, and since no belief stands alone, but is held in the context of other things believed, sound relations among beliefs are bound to be epistemically important.


Justify Belief Epistemic Justification Acceptance System Coherence Theory Relational Coherence 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • John W. Bender
    • 1
  1. 1.Ohio UniversityUSA

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