Abstract
Hegel sketches the self-critical activity of consciousness’ cognitive efforts in four paragraphs. The first of these (¶13) discusses consciousness’ self-critical revision of its conceptions in general; the latter three (¶¶14–16) focus on particular aspects of this process. (In Miller, these are designated ¶¶86–88.) Paragraph 13 seems at first to be clear enough, but a closer look reveals that it is as obscure as the other three tortuous paragraphs. The task of this chapter is to disentangle and reconstruct Hegel’s claims in these paragraphs in light of the problems and doctrines discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. First, further evidence will be given for the eight-fold distinction of elements of consciousness as a cognitive relation to the world discussed in the previous chapter. Second, it will be shown how the criterial inference based on the distinction of these eight elements grounds a form of consciousness’ critical revision of its conceptions of knowledge and of the world.
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Notes to Chapter Eight
This was shown in Chapter Seven §IID3, pp. 106–108.
See Chapter Seven §11 B and C, pp. 102–103.
G60.1–3/D22/M54.24–27.
Chapter Seven §IID2, pp. 105–106.
G59.32–35/D21/M54.11–17.
G56.1–2/D13/M49.29.
Chapter Nine §V, pp. 133–134.
G59.34–35/D21/M54.14–17.
G60.3–5/D22/M54.27–30.
See Chapter Seven §IIB and C, pp. 102–103.
G60.4–5/D22/M54.29–30.
See §D below, p. 119, and Chapter Seven §IIC, p. 103.
For example, since consciousness’ self-conception is in part a conception of itself as a cognizer, as being cognitively related to the world, altering its conception of knowledge would ipso facto alter its self-conception. See Chapter Nine §V, pp. 133–134.
G60.5–9/D22/M54.30–34.
See Chapter Seven §IID2, pp. 105–106.
G60.9–10/D22/M54.34–36.
G60.10–14/D22–23/M54.37–55.2.
G60.20–23/D23/M55.9–12.
M. Theunissen notes that Hegel is hardly clear enough about what this ambiguity is supposed to be (‘Begriff und Realität’ [op. cit.], p. 329).
G60.23–25/D23/M55.12–14.
See Chapter Seven §IID1, pp. 104–105.
See Chapter Seven §II B and C, pp. 102–103.
This is Lauer’s view of this passage (op. cit.), p. 38. See Chapter Ten on Hegel’s ontology.
G56.6/D13/M49.34.
G57.2–3/D15/M50.39–40. See §IIIB, below pp. 125–126.
G57.1–12/D15–16/M50.38–51.10.
See Chapter Nine §IV regarding Hegel’s Phenomenology and the Meno paradox (pp. 132–133).
G61.8–12/D24–25/M56.1–7.
G58.8–10/D17–18/M52.9–14.
See Chapter Five p. 89 and note 102 (on p. 252).
See, e.g., G81.3–5/M78.33–35, G121.3/M125.21–22, and G136.23–30/M144.28–31.
“[W]hen consciousness sets about the examination of truth straightaway, it is still filled and burdened with these natural notions and so it is, in fact, incapable of what it wants to undertake” (G56.33–35/D15/M50.31–34). Cf. Chapter Six §III, pp. 94–95.
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Westphal, K.R. (1989). The Self-Critical Activity of Consciousness. In: Hegel’s Epistemological Realism. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 43. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2342-3_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2342-3_9
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