Abstract
In the previous chapter, certain methodological points Hegel makes in paragraphs 14–16 of the Introduction were set aside in order to focus on the self-critical revision of standards of knowledge. These points are taken up in this chapter and elaborated in view of some of Hegel’s other methodological considerations, both those mentioned elsewhere in the Introduction and those presupposed by his method as outlined therein. Section II discusses Hegel’s conception of experience. Section III considers certain views about principles and practices implied by Hegel’s method. Section IV explores how Hegel’s method is sensitive to the Meno paradox. Section V examines Hegel’s views about the motivations for consciousness’ self-critical examination. Section VI discusses Hegel’s claim that his phenomenological method is a methodological skepticism. Section VII treats Hegel’s claim that his method is a science. Section VIII considers briefly again Hegel’s solution to the problem of our begging the question against the forms of consciousness displayed in the Phenomenology. Section IX discusses whether Hegel is open to the charge of begging the question against opponents by giving an analysis of consciousness in the Introduction. I close in section X by considering the problem of the completeness of the series of forms of consciousness Hegel presents.
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Notes to Chapter Nine
Lauer (op. cit.), p. 37.
Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind (op. cit.), p. 2.
Plato, Meno (W. K. C. Guthrie, tr. [in: E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, eds., Plato: Collected Dialogues {Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1961}, pp. 353–384]), 80d. References to this dialogue are given below by standard line numbers.
Meno 82e.
Meno 82d.
Meno 83bc, 83e.
Meno 84a-d.
Meno 84c.
Meno 85a.
Meno 84d.
See §IV on Hegel’s phenomenological method and the Meno paradox, pp. 132–133.
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Westphal, K.R. (1989). Some Further Methodological Considerations. In: Hegel’s Epistemological Realism. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 43. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2342-3_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2342-3_10
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