Introduction

Abstract

Is there a way the world is regardless of how we think it? If so, can we know the way the word is? Is knowledge a socio-historical phenomeno? Various philosophers in various periods have answered these questions differently, but rarely has it been thought that all three questions could be answered affirmatively. Hegel holds the controversial position that all three questions can be answered affirmatively. In so doing, Hegel rejects both skepticism—there may be a way the world is, but we can’t know it—and what I call “subjectivism”—we can know the way the world is, but we can’t know it—and what Icall depend upon our cognitive or linguistic activity. I argue that Hegel defends what I call “epistemological realism”:we can know the way the world is, even thoughit is not dependent upon our cognitive or linguistic activity. Many may find my contention surprising, but what is interesting is that he defends this realism by grounding it in a social and historical account of emnirical knowledge.