Abstract
Reid’s account of justice follows the familiar pattern of ad hominem arguments against Hume blended with an exposition of an alternative theory. The reasons for Hume’s treatment of justice as an artificial virtue are well-known. For Hume, being just means to accord to each what is his due, as of right, under the established rules of property. Put crudely, the virtue of justice lies in its utility in maintaining property as a bulwark of stable society; its artificiality lies in its dependence on the man-made conventions which create property rights. Because of the attention it gives to property rights, Hume’s thepry has been classified as rights-based in contrast to theories based on need or some sort of merit or desert.(1) However it is better to regard it as a goal-based rule-utilitarian theory and to take Reid’s theory as an example of a rights-based one. (2) Hume’s goal is the stabi1ity of property and society. Individual rights are thus incidental to that goal.
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Notes
Cf., e.g., Miller (1976).
For these terms see Dworkin (1977, pp. 171-3).
AP, V, v (Works, pp. 652-3).
AP, V, v (Works, pp. 653-5).
Hume (1975, p. 283).
AP, V, v (Works, p. 657).
AP, V, v (Works, p. 655).
AP, III, Pt. III, v & vi (Works, pp. 586-92).
AP, V, v (Works, p. 655).
Hume (1978), p. 478.
AUL MS 2131/8/IV/3.
AP, V, iii (Works, p. 643).
AP, V, v (Works, p. 656).
AP, V, v (Works, p. 644).
AP, V, v (Works, p. 656).
AUL MS 2131/8/IV/3 (Spelling and punctuation follows the manuscript).
AP, V, v (Works, p. 657).
AP, V, v (Works, p. 656).
Smith (1978, p. 9); Cf., Smith (1976). Reid’s Aberdeen Philosophical Society Paper on Justice was delivered in 1758, prior to the publication of Smith’s ideas.
Cf., AP, III, Pt. II, II (Works, p. 557).
Hume (18978), p. 475.
AP, V, V (Works, p. 657).
AP, V, v (Works, p. 657).
AP, V, v (Works, p. 658). Reid’s right to liberty is clearly then not simply a freedom from confinement as implied on p. 656; it is a freedom to act in gratifying desires, a positive rather than a negative liberty. But, as Reid acknowledges, the right to gratify desires is restricted not simply by what would hurt others but also by the duties of an individual to God and to self.
AP, V, v (Works, p. 658).
AP, V, v (Works, p. 658).
AUL MS 2131/7/VII/1c.
AUL MS 2131/7/VII/1c.
AUL MS 2131/7/VII/II.
AP, V, v (Works, p. 659).
See AUL MS 2131/7/VII/II. For an application of Hohfeld’s ‘Rights’ terminology to Reid’s work, see Dalgarno (1984) and (1985).
AP, V, iii (Works, p. 645).
Hume (1975), p. 194.
AUL MS 2131/7/III/Ib.
AUL MS 3061/6.
AP, V, V (Works, p. 659).
AP, V, v (Works, pp. 659-60). Cf. Hume (1975), p. 186.
AP, V, v (Works, p. 662).
AP, V, v (Works, p. 662).
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Mackinnon, K. (1989). Thomas Reid on Justice: A Rights-Based Theory. In: Dalgarno, M., Matthews, E. (eds) The Philosophy of Thomas Reid. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 42. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2338-6_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2338-6_22
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