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Perception

  • Richard L. Tieszen
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 203)

Abstract

Most of the work that has been done by phenomenologists is concerned with the phenomenology of straightforward perception. It is in this area that one could expect to find the deepest and most illuminating analyses of Husserl’s general distinction between intentions and the fulfillment of intentions. Perceptual intuition may be considered generally to be a process which provides the relevant evidence for a person’s beliefs about medium-sized physical objects and about the physical world as a whole. Since the basic structure of the acts involved in ordinary perceptual intuition is supposed to be the same as that of the acts involved in mathematical intuition it would be a good idea to consider in more detail how the notion of fulfillment of intentions to ordinary perceptual objects is to be understood.

Keywords

Physical Object Perceptual Object Perceptual Belief Background Belief Metaphysical Realism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Ideas, section 44. Boyce-Gibson’s and my translations.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    EJ, section 8. The following passage in the text is also section 8.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    EJ, section 8. On internal/external horizon discussed below see, for example, EJ section 8.Google Scholar
  4. 5.
    For a nice description of the temporal structure of straightforward perception see I. Miller’s Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness [94].Google Scholar
  5. 6.
    Ideas, section 44. The following passage is also from section 44.Google Scholar
  6. 7.
    CM, section 22. Also, see Ideas, section 142.Google Scholar
  7. 8.
    Ideas, section 142.Google Scholar
  8. 9.
    Robin Gandy, “Church’s Thesis and Principles for Mechanisms” [36]; H. Dreyfus “What Computers Can’t Do” [22].Google Scholar
  9. 10.
    See e.g., Ideas, section 143.Google Scholar
  10. 11.
    Parsons’ “What is the Iterative Conception of Set?” [112].Google Scholar
  11. 12.
    Parsons’ “Quine on the Philosophy of Mathematics” [111], p. 191.Google Scholar
  12. 13.
    Ideas, section 138.Google Scholar
  13. 14.
    Ideas, section 131. See also section 129.Google Scholar
  14. 15.
    See Kaplan [73]. Also Smith and McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality [128], pp. 213–222, 290–291, 359–360, 362–369. Also, Smith [125], [126], [127]. Also, I. Miller [94] on the behavior of the determinable “x”, pp. 60–80.Google Scholar
  15. 16.
    LI, I, section 26. For more material on “occassional expressions” see LI, VI, section 5.Google Scholar
  16. 18.
    CM, section 14.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Richard L. Tieszen

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