The Phenomenological View of Intuition

  • Richard L. Tieszen
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 203)


In this chapter I shall present and discuss some of the most important material from Husserl’s texts on intentionality and intuition, and the role of intuition in mathematical knowledge. The writings of Husserl show very clearly that on his conception of intuition there is an analogy between perceptual and mathematical intuition. A more detailed analysis of Husserl’s views on ordinary perceptual intuition will follow in the next chapter by way of exploring and developing this analogy in later chapters. Some of Husserl’s general remarks on the concept of truth and its relation to evidence (Evidenz) given by intuition will also be considered in this chapter, as will ideas about adequate, apodictic, a priori and intersubjective evidence. Especially relevant for the notion of mathematical intuition are Husserl’s remarks on founding, acts of abstraction, acts of reflection, and the idea of hierarchies of acts built up by reflection and abstraction. Some of the most important texts on these matters will be considered.


Abstract Object Mathematical Knowledge Formal Abstraction Mathematical Belief Mathematical Intuition 
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    See especially LI, I, V. Also Ideas, FTL, CM.Google Scholar
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    Several studies that might be helpful for understanding my presentation are Smith and McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality [128]; Miller, Husserl and Temporal Awareness [94]; Føllesdal’s papers [29], [30], [31]; Mohanty, Concept of Intentionality [96], and [97], [98], [99].Google Scholar
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    Ideas, section 24. Boyce-Gibson’s translation, which I modify at certain points.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

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  • Richard L. Tieszen

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