Abstract
In this chapter I shall present and discuss some of the most important material from Husserl’s texts on intentionality and intuition, and the role of intuition in mathematical knowledge. The writings of Husserl show very clearly that on his conception of intuition there is an analogy between perceptual and mathematical intuition. A more detailed analysis of Husserl’s views on ordinary perceptual intuition will follow in the next chapter by way of exploring and developing this analogy in later chapters. Some of Husserl’s general remarks on the concept of truth and its relation to evidence (Evidenz) given by intuition will also be considered in this chapter, as will ideas about adequate, apodictic, a priori and intersubjective evidence. Especially relevant for the notion of mathematical intuition are Husserl’s remarks on founding, acts of abstraction, acts of reflection, and the idea of hierarchies of acts built up by reflection and abstraction. Some of the most important texts on these matters will be considered.
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Notes
See especially LI, I, V. Also Ideas, FTL, CM.
Several studies that might be helpful for understanding my presentation are Smith and McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality [128]; Miller, Husserl and Temporal Awareness [94]; Føllesdal’s papers [29], [30], [31]; Mohanty, Concept of Intentionality [96], and [97], [98], [99].
Ideas, section 24. Boyce-Gibson’s translation, which I modify at certain points.
LI, VI, section 45.
LI, VI, section 45.
LI, VI, section 46.
LI, VI, section 46.
LI, VI, section 47.
See especially CM, section 38. Also EJ. Also Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis [53].
LI, VI, section 57.
LI, VI, section 57.
LI, VI, section 60.
See e.g., Parsons “Mathematical Intuition” [105], p. 159. Also, [107], especially p. 21, 184–185.
LI, II, section 8.
FTL, section 58.
FTL, section 60.
FTL, section 105. Following two passages in the text are also section 105. See also sections 106–107. This late view of Husserl about truth is reminiscent of the famous Peircean view.
For a discussion of these problems see Levin, Reason and Evidence in Husserl’s Phenomenology [86].
CM, section 6.
CM, section 6.
FTL, sections 94–96.
See Tragesser, [137].
LI, VI, section 66.
FTL, section 100.
See especiallyLI, I.
LI, I.
LI, I, sections 14–15.
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Tieszen, R.L. (1989). The Phenomenological View of Intuition. In: Mathematical Intuition. Synthese Library, vol 203. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2293-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2293-8_2
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