Abstract
Phenomenology was defined in the last chapter as a descriptive, eidetic science of transcendentally purified mental life-processes in the natural transcendental attitude. When seized upon in reflection those processes, moreover, are found to exhibit a noetic-noematic plane of demarcation according to which all actional and secondary passive mental life-processes are founded on and “presuppose” all primary passive mental life-processes (although the converse is not the case). This noetic-noematic plane of demarcation provided a clue for determining the correct methodic order in which the step-by-step transcendental phenomenological refrainings and reductions are to be carried out by means of what Husserl called “abstractive” or, perhaps better expressed, “discriminatory,” procedures that will reveal and objectivate the variously reduced strata of oriented constitution. By making explicit these procedures for refraining from the general positing in which the naturalness of the natural transcendental attitude consists it will be possible at the same time to critically examine the specific context in which Husserl introduces the notion of oriented constitution in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation: objectivation of the constituting of the “primordial quasi-objective world.”
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Notes
Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen, sections 44, 58, 61.
Husserl, Ideen, Second Book, section 64.
This is, in fact precisely what Kant would seem to do in De Mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis. For a discussion of Kant in this connection, see Ernst Cassirer, Kants Leben und Werke, pp. 105f.
I have published my own account in “The Constancy Hypothesis in the Social Sciences,” Life-World and Consciousness. Essays for Aron Gurwitsch, pp. 558ff.; “Transcendental Phenomenology of Reason,” pp. 1–14, and “Private Faces,”pp. 167–177.
José Ortegay Gasset, El Hombre y la Gente, Chapters IV, VI; Hans Reiner, “Sinn und Recht der phänomenologischen Methode,” Edmund Husserl 1859–1959, pp. 134–147.
Alfred Schütz, Collected Papers, Vol. III, pp. 51–83.
See F. Kersten, “Can Sartre Count?” pp. 339–354.
Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, sections 17, 22, 23. See also in this connection, Aron Gurwitsch, “Perceptual Coherence as the Foundation of the Judgment of Predication,” pp. 62–89.
Schütz, ibid., pp. 79ff.
Eugen Fink, “Die Phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Hus-serls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik,” pp. 322, note 1. (English translation, p. 145, note 3.)
Oscar Becker, “Beiträge zur phänomenologischen Begründung der Geometrie und ihrer physikalischen Anwendungen,” pp. 508ff. For basic differences with Becker on this issue, see below, Part Two, Chapters Two and Three.
In this connection, see the thorough study of Robert Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations. How Words Present Things, Chapter Four.
Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen, p. 128; translation p. 97.
Ibid., p. 122; translation p. 90.
Ibid., section 42.
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Kersten, F. (1989). Specific Transcendental Phenomenological Procedures. In: Phenomenological Method: Theory and Practice. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2265-5_2
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