The Ensoulment of Sensation: Triumph of the Totalizing Psyche

  • Jonathan Kearns Cooper-Wiele
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 112)


Husserl’s great Ideatic inversion in LU intersects with what might be called the “great reversal” in the same work. The latter decisively draws the fangs of spatio-temporal reality, causality, and the probability associated with the inductive method appropriate to it.


Immanent Object Intentional Object Sense Object Immanent Sphere Transcendental Phenomenology 
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  1. 1.
    The analogy to Marx’s criticism is drawn by Donn Welton in his article, “Structure and Genesis in Husserl’s Phenomenology,” found in Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977) p. 54.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Edmund Husserl, Husserliana, Band XIX/1 and Band XIX/2, Logische Untersuchungen, edited by Ursula Panzer. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), II, pp. 127–138. All references are made to the first edition of 1901, and give the number of the investigation cited in Roman numerals.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Ibid., V, p. 269.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Ibid., VI, p. 505.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Ibid., II, pp. 127–128.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Ibid., II, p. 159. That which is immanent is termed “reell” by Husserl in order to distinguish it from that which is not, and, hence, termed “real.”Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Ibid., II, p. 160.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Ibid., V, p.469.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Ibid., II, p. 193.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Ibid., II, p. 159.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Ibid., V. p. 327.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Ibid., Appendix, pp. 713–714.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Ibid., see Appendix, p. 708, for Husserl’s definition of sensations as non-acts.Google Scholar
  14. 15.
    Ibid., Appendix, pp. 709–10. Husserl also attacks Brentano’s essentially wrong employment of the term “perception” in his doctrine of “inner perception.” See V, pp. 350–2 for criticisms of other Brentanonian terms. Husserl is sharply critical here of talk of objects “entering” consciousness.Google Scholar
  15. 16.
    See, e.g., I, p. 74.Google Scholar
  16. 17.
    See I, p. 37.Google Scholar
  17. 18.
    Ibid., I, pp. 30–40.Google Scholar
  18. 19.
    Ibid., VI, pp. 496–7. The interpretation is not the interpretative act, but it cannot arise without it. The expression is given, Husserl writes, in the same way as physical objects, i.e., there is a “certain act-experience in which such and such sensational experiences are ‘apperceived’ in a certain manner.” V, pp. 382–383.Google Scholar
  19. 21.
    Ibid., V, p. 398.Google Scholar
  20. 22.
    See V, p. 408 where Husserl states that the direction toward an object is not to be understood literally in the sense of grasping it like a hand grasps a pen.Google Scholar
  21. 23.
    Ibid., V, p. 399.Google Scholar
  22. 24.
    Ibid., V, p. 408. Google Scholar
  23. 25.
    Ibid., V, pp. 361–2.Google Scholar
  24. 26.
    Ibid., Appendix, pp. 711–12.Google Scholar
  25. 27.
    Ibid., V, p. 387.Google Scholar
  26. 28.
    Ibid., V, pp. 387–88.Google Scholar
  27. 29.
    Ibid., Appendix, p. 711.Google Scholar
  28. 30.
    Ibid., V, p. 385.Google Scholar
  29. 31.
    Ibid., Introduction, p. 12. In PSL Husserl ultimately deferred to the “ordinary” view that the object is intuited and rejected the “thing itself” of the psychologists. In that article ordinary perception happened to be an ally of Husserl’s, and of totalizing consciousness. Here it is and remains naïve in its obliviousness to the constitutive power of consciousness.Google Scholar
  30. 32.
    Ibid., I, pp. 74–75.Google Scholar
  31. 33.
    Ibid., V, pp. 345–6.Google Scholar
  32. 35.
    Op. cit., III, p. 241.Google Scholar
  33. 36.
    Ibid., V, p. 369.Google Scholar
  34. 37.
    Ibid., V, pp. 328–29.Google Scholar
  35. 38.
    Ibid., V, p. 375.Google Scholar
  36. 39.
    Ibid., Appendix, p. 698.Google Scholar
  37. 40.
    Ibid., V, p. 370.Google Scholar
  38. 41.
    Ibid., V, p. 372; Appendix, p. 704.Google Scholar
  39. 42.
    Ibid., Appendix, pp. 704–711.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jonathan Kearns Cooper-Wiele
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Massachusetts at BostonUSA

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