The Intuitive Totalization of the Individual Sense Object

  • Jonathan Kearns Cooper-Wiele
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 112)


Husserl’s “Psychological Studies for an Elementary Logic” (hereafter PSL) of 1894 is immensely rich in that, on the one hand, it continues and deepens many themes of earlier publications. Husserl apparently continued to work on many topics he intended to address in the projected second volume of PA until at least the year of this article. The latter undoubtedly reflects ruminations on issues suggested by, if not adequately addressed in, the first volume.1 On the other hand, PSL contains analyses which endured and were elaborated in subsequent publications (the most immediate being the third and fifth of his Logical Investigations).2


Objective Unity Chapter Versus Immanent Sphere Individual Thing Actual Grasp 
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  1. 2.
    See the introduction to the translation of PSL in HSW, p. 120; also Willard, LOK, p. 6.Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    Husserl makes this assertion in his Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik aus dem Jahre 1894,” published in the Archiv für systematische Philosophie III of 1897, p. 226. See Willard’s translation of it in the volume of The Personalist 58 (1977), pp. 317–18.Google Scholar
  3. 4.
    de Boer (DHT, pp. 16–17) is one who appears to regard it as an entirely novel discovery of PSL.Google Scholar
  4. 5.
    Willard, LOK, p. 6.Google Scholar
  5. 6.
    PSL, pp. 187ff.; Section 7, entitled, Excursus Concerning the Psychological and Logical Meaning of both Functions and the Importance of Their Investigation.”Google Scholar
  6. 7.
    Ibid., p. 159.Google Scholar
  7. 8.
    Ibid., p. 180.Google Scholar
  8. 10.
    PSL., p. 167.Google Scholar
  9. 11.
    Ibid., pp. 180–1.Google Scholar
  10. 13.
    PSL, pp. 166–167. Husserl uses the terms “wirklich” and “eigentlich” more or less interchangeably, sometimes with reference to representations” (when, often, the latter term obviously refers to their contents) and sometimes, as here, with explicit reference to the contents of such.Google Scholar
  11. 14.
    Ibid., pp. 168–9.Google Scholar
  12. 15.
    PSL, p. 170.Google Scholar
  13. 16.
    Ibid., pp. 177–9.Google Scholar
  14. 18.
    Ibid., pp. 182–184.Google Scholar
  15. 19.
    Ibid., p. 187.Google Scholar
  16. 20.
    Ibid., p. 184.Google Scholar
  17. 21.
    Ibid., pp. 174–5.Google Scholar
  18. 23.
    PSL, p. 173.Google Scholar
  19. 24.
    Ibid., p. 171.Google Scholar
  20. 26.
    PSL, p. 171.Google Scholar
  21. 27.
    Ibid., p. 184.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jonathan Kearns Cooper-Wiele
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Massachusetts at BostonUSA

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