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The Symbolic Totalization of Sensible Multitudes

  • Jonathan Kearns Cooper-Wiele
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Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 112)

Abstract

In the chapter preceding his discussion of the symbolic representation of number in PA, Husserl explores “the symbolic representations” of sensible multiplicities.1 These analyses parallel those following. However, the accounts only parallel one another. The pre-given or pre-totalized sensible multitudes are not abstractive bases for number concepts. Rather, Husserl demonstrates that the problems encountered in the realm of sense are analogous to those encountered in that of the formal. His prime objective with regard to the former is to account for how that which is “not directly given” but given “indirectly through signs,” may also be understood in light of the mechanisms of “actual ... representation.”2 Husserl cannot but seek to understand that which eludes the immediate grasp of consciousness in terms of that which does not.

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Notes

  1. 2.
    PA 193,7–12.Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    Ibid., p. 193, n. 1.Google Scholar
  3. 4.
    Ibid., p. 195, 9–20, and n. 1.Google Scholar
  4. 5.
    Ibid., p. 195,20–30.Google Scholar
  5. 6.
    Ibid., p. 196, 14–29.Google Scholar
  6. 7.
    Ibid., p. 196,35–197, 10.Google Scholar
  7. 8.
    Ibid., p. 197, 11–16.Google Scholar
  8. 9.
    Ibid., p. 197, 16–17.Google Scholar
  9. 10.
    Ibid., p. 197, 18–29.Google Scholar
  10. 11.
    Ibid., p. 197, 13–198,8.Google Scholar
  11. 12.
    Ibid., p. 198, 25–34; 199, 14–17.Google Scholar
  12. 13.
    Ibid., p. 200, 11–201,4.Google Scholar
  13. 14.
    Ibid., p. 201, 5, ff.Google Scholar
  14. 15.
    Ibid., p.201,6–12.Google Scholar
  15. 16.
    Ibid., p. 201, 13.Google Scholar
  16. 18.
    PA 203, 19.Google Scholar
  17. 19.
    Ibid., p. 204, 19–22.Google Scholar
  18. 20.
    Ibid., p. 206, 9–11, see also n. 1 on Stumpf.Google Scholar
  19. 21.
    Ibid., p. 205, 14–17 ff.Google Scholar
  20. 22.
    Ibid., p. 201, 31–32; 10–12.Google Scholar
  21. 23.
    Ibid., p. 202, 8–11.Google Scholar
  22. 24.
    Ibid., p. 201, 32–35.Google Scholar
  23. 25.
    Ibid., p. 50.Google Scholar
  24. 26.
    Ibid., p. 214, 2–4.Google Scholar
  25. 27.
    Ibid., p. 202, 39–203, 18.Google Scholar
  26. 28a.
    Hussel claimed priority to Ehrenfels in the discovery of quasi-qualities.” Spiegelberg seems to regard Stumpf as having had the most influence on later Gestalt Psychology. See his The Phenomenological Movement, 2nd. ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, Phaenomenologica, vol. 5/6, 1971) p. 54.Google Scholar
  27. 28b.
    Although he does not discuss questions of influence, Gurwitschs article, Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego: Studies of the Relation between Gestalt Theory and Phenomenology” in his Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966) is helpful. See esp. pp. 250–267.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jonathan Kearns Cooper-Wiele
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Massachusetts at BostonUSA

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