Abstract
Up to this point the totalizing psyche is preeminent and apparently omnipotent. Yet a challenge to this preeminence is sounded in BZ itself when Husserl states that all objects agree only in that they are “contents of representations,” or are “represented by means of contents of representations in our consciousness.” There are entities which are not immediate contents of representing consciousness, which are not “in” it as such.
Up to this point the totalizing psyche is preeminent and apparently omnipotent. Yet a challenge to this preeminence is sounded in BZ itself when Husserl states that all objects agree only in that they are “contents of representations,” or are “represented by means of contents of representations in our consciousness.” There are entities which are not immediate contents of representing consciousness, which are not “in” it as such.
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Notes
PA 287, 5–12.
Ibid., pp. 74, 20–75, 16. In the original BZ form of the passage just cited, (PA 74, 14–19/BZ 333, 35–334, 3), the “einem” was emphasized by Husserl.
Ibid., pp. 90–91.
Ibid., pp. 54, 39–55, 4 (BZ 323, 14–18). See also PA pp. 42, 6–8, where Husserl indirectly corroborates this point. There he observes that the concept of the “connection” is not to be found in the contents, but only in the acts — and, as a result of this, it is found only in reflection on the acts.
A few lines earlier, Husserl uses the term, “mediation” with reference to “psychical acts.” These are now specified as “acts of the first order.”
Ibid., pp. 69, 35–70, 1. See Appendix III.
The expansion is found between PA 77, 28, and 80, 6. The passage considered here is located at PA 78, 1–30.
PA 193, n.1.
Ibid., 136, 30–138, 26.
Ibid., 137, 4–5; 138, 15. cf., also, 82, 26–9.
The similarity in structure of this and later accounts, where Husserl recurs to constituting acts on the basis of objects qua “transcendental clues,” does not entail the conclusion Biemel believes it does (see discussion in Appendix II.)
Ibid., 82, 9–29.
Ibid., 181,11–183,8.
Ibid., 182, 18–29. Husserl does not speak explicitly of “concepts” here, but rather of “numbers.” It seems that he has number concepts in mind, however.
PA 192,8–18.
Ibid., 191, 24–35.
Ibid., 190, 18–30.
Ibid., 192, 2–30.
BZ 336,6–10/PA 80, 19–23.
In a footnote on the same page, Husserl refers to concepts which we “do not actually (eigentlich) have.” He uses these terms interchangeably. See Appendix IV.
PA 263, 7–18.
Ibid., 260, 1–5.
PA 237, 8–30.
PA 228, 30–7. A similar point is made at PA 259, 15–34.
Ibid., 237, 18–28. cf., also, PA 238, 8 f.
Ibid., 234, 6–10.
Ibid., 239, 8–16.
Ibid., 267, 29–31; 240, 12–14.
Ibid., 172, 17–18.
Ibid., 237, 30–38.
Ibid., 258, 29–259, 13.
Ibid., 177, 12–28. Husserl, by the time of the writing of Chapter XIII of PA undoubtedly regarded the abstract algebra of universal arithmetic as definitive of numerical arithmetic and not derivative from it. If so, “clarifying” the numerical signs of the latter by indicating their conceptual bases would not clarify arithmetic. The latter could be done only by a similar founding and rendering intelligible of the algorithmic procedures of calculation. The impulse in both instances is similar, if not identical. The only question is if Husserl, at the point of writing Chapter XIII, regarded the “art of arithmetical knowledge” to pertain to calculation or to the variables involved in it. In either case it would seem to be a clarification of signs. See Willard’s discussion of Husserl’s manuscript of 1890, “On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic),” (LOK, pp. 112–14), and of Husserl’s position at the time of his writing Chapter XIII of PA. Willard concedes that nowhere, in that chapter or in any other of PA, does Husserl actually state that the key to such “arithmetical knowledge” is not to be found in concepts, whether “genuine” or “symbolic.” The basic point is sustained by references other than to Chapter XIII (LOK, p. 115).
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Cooper-Wiele, J.K. (1989). Symbolizing: Prosthesis of the Totalizing Act. In: The Totalizing Act: Key to Husserl’s Early Philosophy. Phaenomenologica, vol 112. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2259-4_4
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