Abstract
Nearly everything about the approach to creativity and socialization based upon positing a strict dichotomy between them is misconceived. The mode of questioning, deployment of examples and comparative procedures systematically insure that such an approach will distort precisely what it seeks to clarify. Thus it is not that there are no genuine problems, tensions and paradoxes surrounding creativity and socialization in the social research context; but that the dichotomizing approach is far too abstract to illuminate those problems, tensions and paradoxes. The reasons why this should be so are, nevertheless, far from uninteresting. This is because they are bound up with central issues relating to the ways in which language and action are interwoven.
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Notes
See Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York & London, 1981), pp. 252–255; pp. 296–316.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen, ed. G. H. von Wright (Frankfurt/ Main, 1977), p. 20.
E. M. Cioran, The Temptation to Exist, trans. Richard Howard (Chicago, 1968), p. 131.
Cited in Tore Nordenstam, Explanation and Understanding in the History of Art (Bergen, Norway, 1978), p. 91.
Ernst Mayr’s discussion of Naegeli’s ‘contribution’ to modern biology is a case in point, The Growth of Biological Thought (Cambridge and London, 1982), p. 671f.
Chuang Tsu in Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (Garden City, nd.), p. 20.
Jonathan Culler, Saussure (London, 1976), p. 29ff.
See Heinz R. Lubasz, Professor of Social Theory, University of Essex, Colchester, England.
Gunnar Olsson, Director of the Nordic Institute of Urban and Regional Planning, in particular his “Of Socialization and Creativity”, Nordiska institutt för samhällplanering Meddelande, 1984, no. 7. (Stockholm)
Ferdinand Ebner, Das Wort und die geistige Realitäten (Frankfurt/Main, 1980), p. 262; cf.
Klaus Dethloff, “Ferdinand Ebner und die Psychoanalyse oder Traum vor undnach dem Einschlafen”, Gegen den Traum vom Geist, eds. W. Methlagl et al. (Salzburg, 1985), pp. 162–73.
See my “Popper und Ebner als Denker”, Gegen den Traum vom Geist, pp. 25–32.
See John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (Chicago,1916).
For the Bergen School’s approach to the reconstruction of aesthetic practices see the contributions by Gunnar Danbolt, Kjell S Johannessen and Tore Nordenstam in Contemporary Aesthetics in Scandinavia, eds. L. Aagaard-Mogensen and G. Hermerén (Lund, 1980), pp. 81–132.
For Stephen Toulmin’s development of Dewey’s ‘experimental’ logic see The Uses of Argument (Cambridge, 1957) and Toulmin, Rieke and Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning (2nd ed.; New York, 1984).
Here again, I owe much to Kenneth Barkin; cf. my collection How Not To Interpret A Culture (Bergen, Norway, 1986).
Richard Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler? (Princeton, 1982).
Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, I, p. 219.
Ibid., I, §210.
Ibid., I, §208.
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Janik, A. (1989). Socialization is Creative Because Creativity is Social. In: Style, Politics and the Future of Philosophy. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 114. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2251-8_9
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