Abstract
Being a philosopher today in the wake of the shipwreck of Neo-Kantianism and other such foundationalist ventures is for Richard Rorty a matter of entering into a cultural conversation. The aim of this conversation is to edify in the sense of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of expressing ourselves and coping with the world.1 Rorty alleges that this concept of philosophy emerges from the thought of Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey as they demolished the idea that the goal of philosophy is to represent the world as accurately as possible. For Rorty this does not mark the end of philosophy but the transformation of its role as a discipline. From being a kind of super science philosophy has been transformed into a forum for cultural debate in the hands of these thinkers. However, participation in this conversation requires a special kind of philosophizing, which Rorty designates as edifying. He identifies this mode of philosophizing on the basis of a set of distinctions inspired by the work of Thomas Kuhn. Thus, he distinguishes normal from revolutionary philosophers on the basis of whether a thinker participates in well-established communal efforts to solve philosophical problems or tries to alter the direction or the basic methods of the discipline. Then he goes on to distinguish systematic philosophers from edifying ones.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton. 1979), p. 359.
See John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York, 1950), passim.
Cf. “Style and Idea in the Later Heidegger”, above.
Anthony Kenny, “Wittgenstein and the Nature of Philosophy”, Wittgenstein and His Times, ed. B. F. McGuinness (Chicago, 1982), p. 21.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Lecture on Ethics”, Philosophical Review 74 (1965), 8–9
Martin Heidegger, Einführung in der Metaphysik (Tübingen, 1958), passim.
R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford, 1940), p. 31.
On the aphorism as a philosophical tactic see J. P. Stern, Lichtenberg (Bloomington, 1959).
K. T. Fann, Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969), p. 109.
Kenny, op. cit., p. 25.
See note 3.
Richard Popkin, The History of Skepticism (New York, 1968)
Frances Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago, 1966).
Karl R. Popper, “Wie Ich die Philosophie Sehe”, Conceptus XI (1977), p. 17.
Alasdair MacIntyre, “How Virtue Becomes Vice”, Encounter (July, 1975), pp. 11–7.
W. B. Gallie, “Essentially-Contested Concepts”, The Importance of Language, ed. Max Black (Engelwood Cliffs, 1962), pp. 121–46.
William Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse Lexington, Mass, 1974).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Janik, A. (1989). On Edification and Cultural Conversation: A Critique of Rorty. In: Style, Politics and the Future of Philosophy. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 114. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2251-8_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2251-8_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7508-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2251-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive