Abstract
Hume’s argument against justified belief in miracles appears to depend heavily upon the premise that “a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature” [Enquiries, p. 114]. Yet if my explanation of Hume’s argument thus far has been correct this premise actually plays no significant role in the argument. The premise is really a gloss for the underlying supposition that one cannot have an “impression” of a supernatural event. Because no such impression can be had, any allegedly miraculous event, simply because it is allegedly miraculous, cannot ex hypothesis be judged relevantly similar to any other event in experience. And any event that cannot be judged relevantly similar to others in our collective experience, cannot justifiably be believed to have occurred in accordance with Hume’s principles of a posteriori reasoning. (Nor, can one justifiably believe that such an event will occur with any degree of probability whatsoever.)
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Levine, M.P. (1989). Are Miracles Violations of Laws of Nature?. In: Hume and the Problem of Miracles: A Solution. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 41. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2245-7_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2245-7_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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