Abstract
I have argued that given Hume’s regularity account of causation there are ample grounds for supposing that miracles are not logically possible. This is so despite Hume’s explicit acknowledgement that they are possible. A fortiori any knowledge (i.e. justified true belief) of miracles is likewise impossible. I have shown this latter impossibility to be intrinsically connected to the former.
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Levine, M.P. (1989). Miracles and the Logical Entailment Analysis of Causation. In: Hume and the Problem of Miracles: A Solution. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 41. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2245-7_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2245-7_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7505-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2245-7
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