Abstract
Applying these principles to the question of the credibility of testimony to the miraculous, Hume says he can give a “proof” against the credibility of such testimony and not just a “probable” argument. We should, therefore, expect an argument to the effect that past experience, when properly considered (i.e. considered in accordance with the above principles), completely supports a judgment against the credibility of such testimony. In accordance with his notion of “proof” we should expect an argument “derived from the relation of cause and effect, and … entirely free from doubt and uncertainty.” “Past experience” should be understood to refer to some form of collective experience and not simply an individual’s own experience — though some of the things Hume says in his essay may suggest otherwise.8
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Levine, M.P. (1989). Miracles and Reasoning Based on Experience. In: Hume and the Problem of Miracles: A Solution. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 41. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2245-7_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2245-7_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7505-3
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