Abstract
So writes Dreyfus in his introduction to Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science.1 These provocative comments launch a most interesting discussion of Husserl’s relationship to important recent work in philosophy of mind, especially that of Fodor and Searle. If Dreyfus is right, Husserl himself is the author of a proto-Fodorian theory of mental representations, and the tasks he conceived for transcendental phenomenology anticipate modern-day research projects in artificial intelligence and cognitive science. But Dreyfus is a critic of such efforts: indeed, he believes that Heidegger’s reasons for rejecting the very possibility of transcendental phenomenology are basically right. Thus, his ultimate goal in comparing Husserl with “modern mentalists” such as Fodor is to show that both can be tarred with the same brush.
Husserl has finally begun to be recognized as the precursor of current interest in intentionality—the first to have a general theory of the role of mental representations in the philosophy of language and mind. As the first thinker to put directedness of mental representations at the center of his philosophy, he is also beginning to emerge as the father of current research in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence.
—Hubert L. Dreyfus
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Kent Bach (1982), “De Re Belief and Methodological Solipsism,” in Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality (Oxford: Clarendon Press). pp. 121–151.
P. M. Churchland and P. S. Churchland (1981), “Functionalism, Qualia. and Intentionality,” Philosophical Topics 12, pp. 121–145.
Robert C. Cummins (1983), The Nature of Psychological Explanation (Cambridge: MIT Press).
Fred Dretske (1985), “Machines and the Mental,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 59, pp. 23–33.
Hubert L. Dreyfus (ed.) (1982), Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science (Cambridge: MIT Press/Bradford Books).
Kathleen Emmett (1983), “Phenomenology and Cognitive Science: Should You Be Reading Husserl?”, Cognition and Brain Theory 6 pp. 509–516.
J. A. Fodor (1980), “Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology.” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, pp. 63–73: reprinted in Dreyfus (1982), pp. 277–303.
J. A. Fodor (1981), “The Mind-Body Problem,” Scientific American 244 pp. 114–123.
J. A. Fodor (1984), “Mental Representation: An Introduction,” photocopy; colloquium presentation at the University of California. Irvine, 1984.
J. A. Fodor (1985), “Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie’s Vade-Mecum,” Mind 94 pp. 76–100.
Edmund Husserl (1900), Logical Investigations, trans. by J. N. Findlay, (New York: Humanities Press, 1970). [Original German edition, 1900–1901.]
Edmund Husserl (1913), Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie and phanomenologischen Philosophie (Drittes Buch); 1950 edition (Husserlian V). ed. Marly Biemal (The Hague: Nijhoff). [Original German edition, 1913. English trans. by F. Kersten (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982).]
Edmund Husserl (1925), Phenomenological Psychology, trans. by John Scanlon (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962). [Lectures delivered by Husserl in 1925.]
Edmund Husserl (1929), Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. by Dorton Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969). [Original German edition, 1929.]
Edmund Husserl (1931), Cartesian Meditations. trans. by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960). [Original edition, in French, 1931.]
Edmund Husserl (1954), The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. by David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970). [Original German edition, 1954, posthumous.]
Colin McGinn (1982), “The Structure of Content,” in Andrew Woodfield (ed.). Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 207–258.
Ronald McIntyre (1984), “Searle on Intentionality,” Inquiry 27 pp. 468–483.
Hilary Putnam (1975), “The Meaning of Meaning,” in his Philosophical Papers. Vol. II: Mind,Language and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 215–271.
John R. Searle (1983), Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
John R. Searle (1984), “Intentionality and Its Place in Nature,” Synthese 61 pp. 3–16.
David Woodruff Smith (1984), “Content and Context of Perception,” Synthese 61 pp. 61–87.
D. W. Smith and R. I. McIntyre (1982), Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning,and Language (Dordrecht: Reidel).
Stephen Stich (1983), From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case against Belief (Cambridge: MIT Press/Bradford Books).
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Mcintyre, R. (1991). Husserl and the Representational Theory of Mind. In: Smith, JC. (eds) Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 46. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2161-0_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2161-0_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-1242-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2161-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive