Abstract
The most conspicuous feature of any past event is its apparent unreality. A past event does not exist now; it has vanished, passed away, disappeared; it is not present any longer. The alleged unreality of the past is probably the reason why the past itself is rarely an object of systematic philosophical inquiry. Its only feature seems to be a negative one: “to have ceased to exist” or “to have passed out of existence.” What else can be said about it? There seems hardly any problem here at all.
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References
It is interesting that traces of this view may be found in frequently used figures of speech which refer to the past as an abyss or depth into which our present impressions sink or disappear.
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© 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Čapek, M. (1991). The Elusive Nature of the Past. In: The New Aspects of Time. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 125. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2123-8_2
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