Abstract
The purpose of this last chapter is the investigation of the global epistemological implications of the contemporary nominalistic theories we have studied. These theories depart in many points from logical empiricism, they have relativistic and conventionalistic traits, which are not congenial to the spirit of Carnap’s philosophy. How can we explain these tendencies and what conclusions can we draw? Is their source to be found in nominalism and/or in empiricism, which admittedly contain the seed of scepticism?
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Notes
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© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Gosselin, M. (1990). Nominalism, Empiricism and Conventionalism. In: Nominalism and Contemporary Nominalism. Synthese Library, vol 215. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2119-1_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2119-1_9
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