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Nominalism and Contemporary Nominalism pp 40–58Cite as

Logical Semantics and Ontology

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Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 215))

Abstract

In The Logical Structure of the World, Carnap explained that his aim was to build an epistemic-logical system of objects or concepts. This undertaking was meant as a counterpart of the deduction of statements from axioms, which had received in the past far more attention than the methodology of the systematic construction of concepts. His aim was “to advance to an intersubjective, objective world, which can be conceptually comprehended and which is identical for all observers”.1 He wanted to prove something about human knowledge and more in particular about science and its method. If it is true that the objects of science in its various subdivisions can after investigation be reduced to the objects of the constructivistic system that contains as basic concepts “Erlebs”, to which all other objects can be reduced, he has proven that science is basically one and corresponds to the principles of empiricism.

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Notes

  1. W.V.O. Quine, “Designation and Existence”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 36, n26, 1939, p_708 : “As a thesis in the philosophy of science, nominalism can be formulated thus: it is possible to set up a nominalistic language in which all of natural science can be expressed”.

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  2. G. Frege, “On Sense and Reference”, in: Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 1966, p.57.

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  3. G. Frege, “On Concept and Object”, Ibidem, p.42–55.

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  4. Frege, “On Sense and Reference”, p.57.

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  5. lbidem, p.70.

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  6. lbidem, p.70.

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  7. Cf. G. Frege, “Illustrative extracts”, in: Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege, p.84. Abstraction is founded on oblivion of details. Commenting on Husserl’s views on the subject he says: “Inattention is a very strong lie; it must be applied at not too great concentration, so that everything does not dissolve, and likewise not too dilute,so that it effects sufficient change in the things. Thus it is a question of getting the right degree of dilution; this is difficult to manage and I at any rate never succeeded”.

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  8. Ibidem, p.85.

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  9. Frege, “On Concept and Object”, p.43.

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  10. There are objections to this theory though, but we shall discuss them, in chapter 7, on “Particular and General”.

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  11. Ibidem p.55.

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  13. Quine, “Designation and Existence”, p.704: “What is left is but a bandying of empty honorifics and pejoratives - ”existent“ and ”non-existent“, ”real“ and ”unreal“”.

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  14. Ibidem, p.705.

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  15. Ibidem, p.707.

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  17. Ibidem, p.61e.

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  22. Ibidem.

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  38. Ibidem, p.3.

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  39. Ibidem.

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  1. Belgium

    Mia Gosselin (Research Director of the National Fund for Scientific Research)

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© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Gosselin, M. (1990). Logical Semantics and Ontology. In: Nominalism and Contemporary Nominalism. Synthese Library, vol 215. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2119-1_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2119-1_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7453-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2119-1

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