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Logical Semantics and Ontology

  • Mia Gosselin
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 215)

Abstract

In The Logical Structure of the World, Carnap explained that his aim was to build an epistemic-logical system of objects or concepts. This undertaking was meant as a counterpart of the deduction of statements from axioms, which had received in the past far more attention than the methodology of the systematic construction of concepts. His aim was “to advance to an intersubjective, objective world, which can be conceptually comprehended and which is identical for all observers”.1 He wanted to prove something about human knowledge and more in particular about science and its method. If it is true that the objects of science in its various subdivisions can after investigation be reduced to the objects of the constructivistic system that contains as basic concepts “Erlebs”, to which all other objects can be reduced, he has proven that science is basically one and corresponds to the principles of empiricism.

Keywords

Ordinary Language Natural Sign Linguistic Sign Logical Semantic Individual Thing 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    W.V.O. Quine, “Designation and Existence”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 36, n26, 1939, p_708 : “As a thesis in the philosophy of science, nominalism can be formulated thus: it is possible to set up a nominalistic language in which all of natural science can be expressed”.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    G. Frege, “On Sense and Reference”, in: Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 1966, p.57.Google Scholar
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    lbidem, p.70.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    lbidem, p.70.Google Scholar
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    Cf. G. Frege, “Illustrative extracts”, in: Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege, p.84. Abstraction is founded on oblivion of details. Commenting on Husserl’s views on the subject he says: “Inattention is a very strong lie; it must be applied at not too great concentration, so that everything does not dissolve, and likewise not too dilute,so that it effects sufficient change in the things. Thus it is a question of getting the right degree of dilution; this is difficult to manage and I at any rate never succeeded”.Google Scholar
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    There are objections to this theory though, but we shall discuss them, in chapter 7, on “Particular and General”.Google Scholar
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    William Ockham, Summa Logicae, I, Cap. 70, p.190.Google Scholar
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    Ibidem, p.201. William Ockham, Summa Logicae I, Cap. 70, p.191.Google Scholar
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    Ibidem, p.3.Google Scholar
  39. 35.
  40. 36.
    G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1963, p.74.Google Scholar
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  44. 40.
    Cf. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity p.234Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mia Gosselin
    • 1
  1. 1.Belgium

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