Philosophy of the Concrete

Abstract

The first formulation of the concretism, which then and afterwards has been called reism, can be traced back to 1929. In Elementy in a paragraph closing the discussion of ontological categories, we read as follows:

“…the entire reduction of categories, as outlined above, took place precisely to their (i.e. things’ — K.S.) benefit. That reduction completed, it turns out that there remains only that category of objects — that is, there are no objects other than things, in other words, every object is a thing, whatever exists is a thing. When metaphorical, abbreviated, picturesque, in a word, substitutive, formulations are eliminated and replaced by the basic formulations, interpreted literally, the latter will include no phrases which would appear to be names of something other than things. They will be statements about things only. But it must be emphasized here that by things we do not mean only inorganic solids. Things are inorganic and organic, inanimate and animate, and ‘endowed with psychic life’ — that is, they are both things in the narrower sense of the word, and persons, too. So much for the reduction of categories of objects to the category of things. The stand taken here by those in favour of such a reduction might be called reism.” (p. 55–6)