Abstract
Systematic definitions of psychological concepts are rare in psychology. Rather they are systematically neglected in favour of a systematic specification of experimental techniques. The probable reason for this all but deliberate neglect is that psychologists recognize in these definitions the conventions of everyday human knowledge, to which they are professionally disinclined to conform. Psychologists ought not be led by the archaeology of the memory in Proust, the Odyssey of here and now in Joyce, and in general by the lexical contingencies of language.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
According to Wilson (1978, p. 181), Descartes was firmly committed to the possibility of providing physiological accounts of all mental occurrences except the exercise of pure understanding. Only pure understanding has no connection at all with the brain.
See Brentano (1971, II). There are some interesting parallels between Brentano’s description of psychological concepts and Wittgenstein’s. See further chapter 4, § 3.
See Köhler (1929, p. 30), where he asks why the problem of behaviourism has no parallel in physics: The answer is simple enough: Physics is an old science and psychology is in its infancy’. Wittgenstein refers to Köhler’s ‘young science’ theory without mentioning him by name in Philosophical Investigations II xiv, p. 232.
The highly speculative character of James’s physiological explanations is also commented on by Myers (1986).
I mean Ryle’s distinction between ‘occurrences’ and ‘dispositions’. See Ryle (1949, chapter 5). But for a similar use, see also Armstrong (1968, pp. 82–89).
See James (1890, II, p. 7).
See Schopenhauer (1888, pp. 52–57). Schopenhauer, as so many others, is quoted by James (1890, II, pp. 273–275).
See Bain (1855, p. 183).
See Moore (1903, p. 450).
Brentano discusses the subject in his ‘Vom Phänomenalen Grün’ (1907, pp. 5–44).
See James (1890, II, pp. 181–182), chapter XX.
See James (1890, II, pp. 181 ff.). Given his view that sensations have a cognitive relation with the outer world from the outset, his image of the ‘little world’ of sensations is rather peculiar.
See James (1890, II, pp. 183 ff.).
See James (1890, II, p. 154).
See James (1890, II, p. 157). According to Vesey (1965, pp. 49–57), Ryle too endorses the local-sign theory.
James (1890, II, pp. 189 ff.) means the psychologists Brown and Delboeuf.
James’s article appeared originally as ‘What is an emotion’ (1884) and as ‘The physical basis of emotion’ (1894), both published in James (1920).
See James (1920, p. 346).
See Wundt (1874).
See James (1920, pp. 351–352), where he confesses to be dissatisfied with the example, but maintains his view that the felt emotion is some or other organic change.
In the early stages of his development Wittgenstein shows much more sympathy with the James-Lange theory (and especially with the idea that the experience of loca table feelings is important) than in his later work; see The Brown Book, p. 103.
James seems to confuse cause and object, for he calls for instance heartbeats the objects of anger. But as Myers (1986, p. 241) rightly remarks, we have to distinguish between the awareness of heartbeats and the feeling of anger. The relation between the emotion and the bodily feeling is contingent and hence the emotion can exist alongside the bodily feeling. In that case the ‘objects’ postulated by James are not required. Wittgenstein would call these ‘objects’ causes.
Wittgenstein does admit that there are typical cases in which the object of emotions is identical to their cause (RPP II, § 148).
Wittgenstein mentions Heidegger in his conversations with Waismann. See McGuinness (1979, pp. 67–68).
See James (1890, II, pp. 51 ff.).
See Köhler (1929, pp. 5–6).
Kosslyn (1973) endorses the ‘picture-theory’ rather explicitly.
See Hume (1978, p. 1).
See Russell (1948, pp. 107–109). The same view can be found in Russell (1921, pp. 145 ff.).
See James (1890, II, pp. 70–71).
Ryle’s position (1949, chapter 8) seems to be more in line with that of Watson. 45 The English translation writes ‘image’ here. The same word is translated in § 84 as ‘image-picture’ and in § 110 as ‘imagination-picture’.
There is a striking resemblance here between Wittgenstein and Sartre. The latter writes for instance that in the imagination ‘je n’y trouverai jamais que ce que j’y ai mis’ (1940, p. 23).
Perhaps Wittgenstein was influenced by this aphorism of Weininger (1904, p. 67): ‘Dualism consists in the fact that we do not create our sensations’.
See Perky (1910). Sartre (1940, p. 108) also criticizes this experiment.
See Hume (1978, p. 2).
Russell’s main thesis is that ‘all psychic phenomena are built up out of sensations and images alone’ (1927, p. 279).
For this sounding-board metaphor, see James (1890, II, p. 471).
An exception must be made for Hintikka (1986, pp. 289 ff.). But Hintikka also wants to accommodate the whole of psychological concepts within the categories of either episodic private experiences or propositional attitudes. His use of the latter is rather dispositional, as evidenced by his examples: belief, hope, and expectation. At any rate it leaves out ‘mental activities’ and ‘abilities’.
This epistemological view of Wittgenstein is held by many authors, such as Albritton (1964), Malcolm (1950; 1954), and Kenny (1975).
See Last Writings, § 959.
See chapter 1, pp. 16–17 for a general description of the content of MS 128. MS 180b is exclusively devoted to feelings of tendency and expectation. The first few pages contain some remarks about the secondary meanings of words (see chapter 6, pp. 161–162 ± 3ff.).
See James (1890, I, pp. 249 ff.).
See James (1890, I, p. 233).
See James (1890, I, p. 243).
See James (1890, I, p. 244).
See Weininger (1903, p. 100) for his remarks about psychology. He writes on the will in (1904, pp. 153–156).
See for instance Mounce (1981, p. 88) and Hacker (1972, pp. 59–60).
This equation is also commented on by Winch (1968).
See James (1890, II, pp. 487–488).
Lotze is also mentioned by James as a supporter of the ideo-motor theory (1890, II, p. 523).
See James (1890, II, pp. 524–525).
The manuscripts concerned are MS 115 (1) and MS 157a. There are also lecture notes on the freedom of the will by Smythies (1945–1946).
For this interpretation, see von Wright (1982, p. 151).
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ter Hark, M. (1990). The Grammar of Psychological Concepts. In: Beyond the Inner and the Outer. Synthese Library, vol 214. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2089-7_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2089-7_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7438-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2089-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive