Abstract
Movements in a language-game, actions, verbal utterances are guided by horizontal and often also vertical relations of rules. On the basis of these rules or rule-guided and normative practices it is logical to distinguish between a correct and incorrect or between a founded or unfounded statement; the regulative practice functions as normative standard for all kinds of justifications and criticisms. As a standard or norm the practice itself is neither founded nor unfounded: at a certain point justification and substantiation are no longer possible. Wittgenstein refers to this end point of justification inherent in every practice by the expression ‘agreement in forms of life’. The present chapter deals with this ‘agreement in forms of life’ and its relation to the context of the foundational argument. Wittgenstein introduces ‘agreement in forms of life’ at the end of a long discussion on the obeying of a rule (PI, § 143–242).
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Notes
I will be referring to Kripke’s article in Block (1981).
See Baker and Hacker (1984) and for a more elaborate account Baker and Hacker (1985). This section owes much to the last work in particular.
See for example Strawson (1983, p. 77) and Malcolm (1986, pp. 157–169).
See Philosophical Remarks, III, § 21.
The link between the problem of colour perception and the problem of rules is explicitly commented upon by Wittgenstein in MS 118: ‘How do I know that in continuing the series +2 I will have to write 200004, 200006 and not 200004, 200008?’ The question is akin to: ‘how do I know that this colour is red?’ (MS 118, p. 1).
Norman Malcolm and in his footsteps Anthony Kenny have encouraged an epistemological reading of On Certainty. Kenny, for instance, writes: ‘Wittgen stein being preoccupied with the theory of meaning was comparatively unin terested in epistemology for much of his life… Toward the end of his life while staying with Norman Malcolm in Ithaca in 1949 he was stimulated by the study of Moore’s articles to begin to write on epistemology’ (Kenny, 1973, p. 204). Malcolm persists in the epistemological reading of On Certainty, as isolated from the main themes of Philosophical Investigations, in his latest book on Wittgenstein (Malcolm, 1986, pp. 201 ff.).
For the same point of view, see von Wright (1982, p. 59).
In fact, Wittgenstein writes much earlier on certainty and doubt, although not as systematically and elaborately as in MS 119. For example, at 3–2–1931 he says in the context of a discussion on solipsism: The words “being certain that” can only be used in connection with a hypothesis. It is pointless to say “I am certain that I have a toothache” except in a sense in which it is possible to doubt that I have a toothache… What does it mean, being certain that one will have a toothache. (If one cannot be certain, one is not allowed by the grammar to use this word in this connection.)’ (MS 110, pp. 31–32). There will be some terminological changes later: instead of ‘I am certain’, Wittgenstein will say ‘I know’.
The last phrase in this quotation about the ‘chain of reasons’ occurs in a different form in Philosophical Investigations, § 211 and 326, where Wittgenstein famously says ‘But the chain of reasons has an end’. The genesis of this insight goes back even further than 1937. In 1931 he says ‘I could also ask it like this: Why do you long for explanations? When they will have been given, you will after all again stand before an end (vor einem Ende stehen). They cannot bring you further than where you are now’ (MS 110, p. 96). And toward the end of 1931, in the context of a discussion of the philosophy of mathematics, he composes the first draft of Philosophical Investigations, § 326: ‘The chain of reasons comes to an end and that in this game (namely at the end of the game) (namely at the limit of the game)’ (MS 112, p. 221).
See MS 119, pp. 124–129.
See Weininger (1904, pp. 142–182). Weininger’s thesis is that just as ethics presupposes a willing subject, logic is in need of a believing subject.
The same thought also occurs in the Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough: ‘A religious symbol does not rest on any opinion. And error belongs with opinion’ (p.3).
The comparison between grammatical rules and methodological rules is possibly inspired by Einstein. Wittgenstein mentions Einstein a few times; for instance, in a discussion about criteria for inner experiences he responds to an adversary as follows: ‘You forget what Einstein, as I surmise, has taught the world: that the method of time measurement belongs to the grammar of time sentences’ (MS 119, pp. 226–227).
This charge is brought by Marcuse (1964, pp. 173 ff.). A more recent version is given by Nyiri (1982). For a convincing criticism of Nyiri, see Janik (1985, pp. 116–136).
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© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Ter Hark, M. (1990). Agreement in Forms of Life. In: Beyond the Inner and the Outer. Synthese Library, vol 214. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2089-7_3
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